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ABSTRACT 
 The main scientific goal of this dissertation is to understand the processes that 
enable individuals to think and act “wisely.” Past theories suggest that (a) age-based life 
experience; (b) culture, and (c) psychological distance are among key factors in wisdom 
acquisition across the lifespan. Combining experimental method with an individual 
difference approach and situating the results in a larger cultural context, the present 
dissertation systematically addresses the question of wisdom-related processes across 
adulthood.  
 After reviewing previous wisdom scholarship, I propose that wisdom involves the 
following set of pragmatic strategies to address social dilemmas: (i) consideration of 
perspectives involved in the conflict; (ii) recognition of the likelihood of change; (iii) 
recognizing multiple ways how the conflict might unfold; (iv) recognition of uncertainty 
and the limits of knowledge; (v) search for a compromise; and (vi) prediction of conflict 
resolution. Chapter II validates this characterization of wisdom by a group of professional 
counselors and wisdom researchers. Moreover, two studies address the question of age 
differences in wisdom, using a representative community sample. Older Americans made 
more use of proposed wise reasoning schemes when talking about social conflicts than 
young and middle-aged Americans. Chapter III examines consequences of wise 
reasoning and showed that it is positively related to individual well-being and longevity. 
ix 
 
Chapter IV situates wisdom-related processes in a larger socio-cultural context by 
examining aging and cultural differences in wise reasoning simultaneously among 
random samples of Japanese vs. Americans. Findings indicate that younger Japanese 
reason more wisely than young Americans, yet yet older Americans are as wise as older 
Japanese. These results, suggest that aging plays a larger role in the attainment of wisdom 
in Western than in East Asian cultures. Chapter V concludes by reporting two 
experiments demonstrating that a distanced perspective on the self enhances wise 
reasoning, attitudes, and behavior. Together, these streams of research begin to illuminate 
a psychological construct of wisdom by highlighting developmental trends, cultural 
factors and individual processes that underlie it, and lay the foundation for developing 
interventions and designing curricula to increase wisdom in daily life. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 With the increasing complexity of social life and resulting uncertainties in the 
new millennium require more wisdom is needed more than ever before. Some scholars go 
as far as to propose that the chief purpose of social sciences should be to promote 
practical wisdom (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Maxwell, 1984). Wisdom was a central topic in 
ancient philosophy. However, it has not been a topic of mainstream scientific inquiry. 
Empirical research on wisdom has been very limited, in particular in social psychology. 
Yet social psychology, with its focus on reasoning and behavior in a social context, 
provides an ideal ground for empirical work on this topic. This dissertation makes an 
initial step towards filling this gap by focusing on wisdom-related processes.  
 Lay beliefs and philosophical theories suggest that age-related experiences, 
culture, and distance from the self play key roles in wisdom acquisition and that wisdom 
leads to well-being across the lifespan. Integrating insights from research on cultural 
psychology, human development, and social cognition, the main goal of this dissertation 
is to evaluate the impact of these factors on wisdom.  
Theoretical construct and literature review 
 The concept of wisdom has a long intellectual history. Therefore, in the next 
section I first provide a brief cultural-historical review, examining some ancient roots and 
philosophical scholarship on this topic. Specifically, this review focuses on some ideas 
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about the nature of wisdom as a psychological construct. Then I review research on 
beliefs and lay theories about wisdom. Finally, I review previous operationalizations of 
wisdom-related processes, pointing out their commonalities, as well as methodological 
shortcomings.   
Wisdom and the Ancients 
 In the arts and humanities, the wisdom literature refers to ancient writings about 
the conduct of good life. Such literature goes as far back as the second or third 
millennium B.C. (Lambert, 1960; Rudolph, 1987) and it is predominantly Near Eastern, 
or East and South-East Asian.  Much of this literature focuses on practical conduct of 
wisdom and cultivation of wisdom through learning. For instance, the Babylonian 
Teachings of Shuruppak discuss adaptive individual dispositions and behaviors (Alster, 
1991). In a similar vein, Chinese Confucianism and Taoism stress experiential learning 
and critical thinking as essential components for wisdom (Brown, 1938; Lin, 1994). 
Confucius is claimed to have said that “to know what you know and what you don’t 
know is the characteristic of one who knows” (Confucius, 2000). This statement suggests 
that one aspect of wisdom is recognition of limits of knowledge (Birren & Svensson, 
2005). Similarly, Taoist writing such as Laozi’s Tao Te Ching emphasizes experiential 
learning. According to Laozi, wisdom can be acquired by following the Three Treasures: 
compassion, simplicity, and humility (Laotse, 1948). In a similar vein, Buddhist thought 
stresses learning through observation, analysis, and self-improvement. The Four Noble 
Truths in Buddhism suggest that selfishness is the key barrier to wisdom. According to 
this teaching, selfishness leads to conflict and misery. One step in overcoming selfishness 
is to recognize how one’s desires affect oneself. A further step focuses on spiritual 
3 
 
training (the Eightfold Path) that involves self-distance from and compromise between 
different desires (Humphreys, 1961, p. 21).  
 Researchers who have reviewed the definition of wisdom in the ancient literature 
suggest that the ancient schools of thought emphasize several common wisdom principles.  
First, ancient schools of thought emphasize the recognition of the ever-changing quality 
of things and uncertainty (e.g. Baltes, 2004, p. 73). Second,  they emphasize 
interdependence and contextualism of things in the world (e.g. Humphreys, 1961, p. 21). 
Finally, the ancient wisdom literature suggests that wisdom involves an orientation 
towards the social context and a concern with the well-being of others (e.g. Baltes, 2004, 
p. 71). 
Wisdom in Western Philosophy 
 Plato’s dialogues about Socrates were among the first Western attempts to define 
wisdom. The oracle of Delphi pronounced Socrates to be the wisest man in Greece, yet 
Socrates believed this claim to be unjustified. Socrates went on to question his fellow 
citizens who claimed to possess a great deal of knowledge in their field (politicians, 
craftsmen, and poets) and found them all overestimating their knowledge. Plato 
concluded that his mentor’s wisdom stemmed from Socrates recognizing the limits of his 
own knowledge (Plato, 2000). In a similar vein, Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, suggests 
that wisdom involves a deliberation about what is variable, and deep understanding of 
causes behind events (vs. the mere knowledge of these events; Aristotle, 2002). Aristotle 
suggests that wisdom manifests itself in different forms: sophia - the divine ability to 
discern the truth; and phronesis – the human ability to reflect and decide how to live well 
(Aristotle, 1953; Birren & Svensson, 2005; Robinson, 1990). For Ancient Greeks, this 
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latter practical wisdom is a deeply social virtue: reflective, judgmental, and rooted in 
conversation (Matson, 1987, p. 66). Wisdom was also a central topic in medieval 
philosophy and that of the Renaissance, which were heavily influenced by Platonism and 
Aristotelianism. For Thomas Aquinas, practical wisdom or prudence was the cause and 
form of all virtues (Aquinas, 2006). In his view it included cognitive components (e.g. 
good memory, logic), but also such reasoning abilities as recognition of uncertainties, 
recognition of alternatives, and recognition of the context when making a judgment 
(Aquinas, 2006, pp. 2a2ae, 47-56) . For Nicholas of Cusa, wisdom constituted the 
awareness of one’s limitations (Rice, 1958, pp. 22-23). However, by the Age of 
Enlightenment, philosophers lost their interest in wisdom as a scholarly discussion topic. 
(Baltes, 2004; Birren & Svensson, 2005).  
 There has been a small revival of wisdom philosophy in the second part of the 
20
th
 century. Instead of providing new definitions, researchers extended the classic works 
with a focus on the elements underlying wisdom and its consequences. Working off 
Aristotle’s theory that wisdom includes knowledge about how to live well (Aristotle, 
1953), modern philosophers emphasize several wisdom-related qualities that may help 
one to live a good life (Dawes, 1988; Kekes, 1995; Lehrer & Smith, 1996; Nozick, 1989; 
M. C. Nussbaum, 1986; Oelmüller, 1989; Tiberius, 2008; Wundt, 1940). Some of these 
qualities focus on a holistic view of the tasks at hand, including reflection on issues from 
a distance, recognition of interrelation, and balance between goals, means, and contexts 
(e.g. Oelmüller, 1989). Another set of proposed qualities centers around management of 
uncertainty, including recognition of one’s limits (Dawes, 1988; M. C. Nussbaum, 1986; 
Wundt, 1940), recognition of contradictions and potential conflict (Nozick, 1989) and 
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awareness of different perspectives on uncertain situations (Kekes, 1995; Tiberius, 2005; 
Welsch, 1989). Finally, modern philosophers suggest that the process of wisdom 
acquisition involves going through a series of direct or vicarious experiences that are 
based on personal life circumstances (Oelmüller, 1989).  
Psychological Theory and Research on Wisdom 
 Though scholarship on wisdom originated in philosophy, there are limitations to a 
purely philosophical treatment of this topic. Philosophical analysis of wisdom is often 
driven by a priori methods of reasoning, and the intuitions of individual philosophers can 
be idiosyncratic (Baltes, 2004; Tiberius & Swartwood, 2011). Complementary to this 
type of analysis is the empirical - experimental study of mind and behavior, which is used 
in psychology.   
 Unfortunately, psychological research on wisdom has been limited and mostly 
theoretical rather than empirical  (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). Researchers who study 
human development have been among the first to devote their attention to the wisdom 
construct. Erik Erikson described wisdom in his theory of identity development. In his 
view, wisdom is attained through mastery of several challenges people encounter over 
their life course. Specifically, Erikson suggested that wisdom is acquired late in life 
through the transcendence of self-focused priorities and acceptance of one’s life as it is 
(i.e. ego-integrity vs. despair about the alternatives that were not pursued; Erikson, 1980, 
1984). Another theoretical perspective on wisdom comes from motivational psychology. 
For Abraham Maslow, the key to wisdom was the desire for self-actualization – the final 
level of human development, which includes the fulfillment of one’s unique potential, 
focus on problems outside oneself, and acceptance of limitations of oneself and others 
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(Maslow, 1968). In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs this level can be achieved when lower 
level needs such as physiological, safety, or esteem needs are satisfied.  
 Vivian Clayton conducted an early empirical study on wisdom which examined 
what adjectives Americans associate with wisdom (Clayton & Overton, 1976). The 
multidimensional scaling analysis revealed three dimensions commonly associated with 
wisdom: cognition (e.g. pragmatic experience, observant), reflection (e.g. introspection 
and intuition), and socio-emotional considerations (e.g. empathy, understanding). 
Importantly, this implicit wisdom construct was more salient for older than younger 
Americans (Clayton & Birren, 1980, p. 137). Another frequent measure of implicit 
theories people have about wisdom involves content analyses of descriptions of wise 
people. For instance, Sowarka (1989) analyzed interviews of 41 elderly Americans and 
found that descriptions of the wise persons were associated with memories about difficult 
social problems. Consistent with these findings, research by Robert Sternberg found that 
lay and academic beliefs about wisdom and intelligence concepts overlap mostly when 
looking at social characteristics (Sternberg, 1985). Bluck and Glück (2005) reviewed 
existing studies on people’s lay conceptions of wisdom and identified five common 
components: cognitive-pragmatic (e.g. good reasoning abilities), insight (e.g. recognition 
of limits of knowledge), reflective attitude (e.g. deliberation on action), concern for 
others (e.g. ability to see others’ perspectives), and real-world problem-solving skills. In 
many ways, these categories show a resemblance to the ancient and philosophical 
characterizations of wisdom.  Another finding that resonates with philosophical ideas on 
wisdom is that lay people expect wisdom to increase in older age (Heckhausen, Dixon, & 
Baltes, 1989; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Rowley & Slack, 2009) 
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 Researchers have also examined beliefs about one’s own wisdom, building on 
Erikson’s and Maslow’s earlier theoretical work on wisdom as part of personality 
development. For instance, Carol Ryff (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), and more recently Chris 
Peterson and Nansook Park (2008) and Monika Ardelt (2003, 2010) used self-report 
questionnaires, in which they asked people to report what they believe is their level of 
personality or socio-emotional development. This research produced inconsistent results. 
Ryff found that older adults report lower level of personal ego-integrity (and thus lower 
wisdom in Erikson’s terms) than younger adults (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), whereas Park and 
Peterson (2008) found no aging effect, and Ardelt (2010) found that older adults believe 
they have better reflective abilities (e.g. self-insight) than college students. There are 
limitations to studying wisdom this way. Self-report measures are influenced by 
inaccuracy of self-judgments (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), self-presentation tendencies and 
context-effects (Schwarz, 1999). Moreover, self-report measures of wisdom are 
inconclusive with regard to philosophical work and lay beliefs, which suggest that 
wisdom involves recognition of limits of one’s own knowledge (see Staudinger & Glück, 
2011, for a similar point). Specifically, it is not clear whether the person who reports 
higher vs. lower mastery of wisdom-related processes is doing it because she is indeed 
wiser or because she lacks a certain level of self-insight.  
 Whereas empirical research has focused on defining wisdom and its correlates, 
behavioral assessment of wisdom has been limited (Birren & Svensson, 2005). A few 
conceptualizations of wise reasoning show a great deal of similarity to philosophical 
themes and lay theories that I reviewed previously. One conceptualization has been 
proposed by Michael Basseches (1980, 1984) and Deirdre Kramer (1990), who represent 
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the neo-Piagetian or post-formal view of reasoning. These researchers formulated a set of 
cognitive schemas involved in wise thinking, among them acknowledgement of others’ 
points of view, appreciation of contexts broader than the issue at hand, sensitivity to the 
possibility of change in social relations, acknowledgment of the likelihood of multiple 
outcomes of a social conflict, concern with conflict resolution, and preference for 
compromise. Another conceptualization came from Paul Baltes, who developed the 
Berlin Wisdom Paradigm. According to this paradigm, wisdom is knowledge useful for 
dealing with life problems. This knowledge includes an awareness of the varied contexts 
of life and how they change over time, recognition that values and life goals differ among 
individuals and among groups, and acknowledgement of the uncertainties of life together 
with ways to manage those uncertainties (Baltes & Smith, 2008). 
 Given the human developmental background of these research groups, it is not 
surprising that the key research question they explored dealt with development of wisdom 
across the lifespan. Researchers hypothesized an age-related increase in wisdom in 
general and pragmatic reasoning competence in particular. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, both Basseches (1980, 1984) and Kramer (1990; 1992; 1986) found that some 
aspects of content-coded wise reasoning were positively associated with age. However, 
due to serious problems in the samples they used, their results were inconclusive with 
regard to difference between the middle-aged and the elderly. Basseches’ sample 
consisted solely of college students and mostly middle-aged university faculty members, 
but no sample of older adults. Kramer used non-representative samples. Furthermore, in 
both lines of research age was confounded with degree of education and possibly with 
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intelligence, and wisdom scores were confounded with the length of the content-analyzed 
narratives.  
 In the most important effort so far, Baltes and colleagues content-analyzed 
narratives that participants generated when asked to comment on another person’s 
personal problems. This work, however, did not find consistent support for the idea that 
wisdom increases into old age. Instead, the researchers found that wisdom approaches an 
asymptote at young adulthood and increases little thereafter (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the study populations tested in this project, if not all 
of them, were non-representative samples of adults, leaving open the possibility that 
selection effects may have colored the results (e.g. sampling only college educated 
subects could lead to a greater selection bias of older vs. younger adults, particularly 
among females; for a general comment on such selection effects in aging research, see 
Whitbourne, 2000). In addition, most of the study populations in the Berlin Wisdom 
project were well-educated adults, which could have restricted the likelihood of detecting 
individual differences in wisdom-related reasoning. Moreover, the stimulus materials in 
the Berlin project consisted of very brief descriptions of personal problems (Smith & 
Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996; Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 1992).  For 
instance, participants were asked to read and respond to such scenarios as “a 15-year-old 
girl wants to get married right away. What should she consider and do?” (Baltes & 
Staudinger, 2000). Such scenarios provided little information about the social context, 
which may be a critical factor in wisdom assessment (Sternberg, 2004).  Thus, it is still 
debatable whether older adults are wiser than younger adults. As the quote by Robert 
Sternberg at the beginning of this dissertation illustrates, wisdom is largely an untapped 
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field of empirical study and more refined methodologies are necessary to provide 
conclusive evidence to the question of aging-related wisdom-gains. Further, there are 
other factors than aging that may influence wisdom, and these factors have not been 
explored yet.  
Wisdom-related processes 
 The main goal of this dissertation is to provide a systematic analysis of four 
wisdom-related factors: age, culture, self-distance, and well-being. I propose that wisdom 
involves the use of certain types of pragmatic reasoning to navigate important challenges 
of social life. This broad view is consistent with the philosophical and lay theories, as 
well as behavioral research I reviewed earlier. Specifically, the following six categories 
emerged as the most the most frequently mentioned characterizations of wisdom in 
psychological literature (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Basseches, 1984; Kramer, 1990; Riegel, 
1973): 1) perspective shifting from one’s own point of view to the point of view of people 
involved in the conflict; 2) recognition of the likelihood of change; 3) prediction 
flexibility, as indicated by multiple possible predictions of how the conflict might unfold; 
4) recognition of uncertainty and the limits of knowledge; 5) search for conflict 
resolution and 6) search for a compromise. Focusing on these types of pragmatic 
reasoning, my work addresses four questions: 1) Does wisdom come with age? 2) What 
are the consequences of wise reasoning? 3) What role does culture play in wisdom-
related processes? 4) Can we facilitate wisdom and if so what are the underlying 
psychological mechanisms?  
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Research Strategy and Study Overview 
 In order to address these questions, the present series of seven studies focus on 
“wisdom in action” – asking participants to reflect on a variety of social problems and 
personal challenges, thus hoping to achieve high ecological validity. The present research 
employs content-analysis techniques to score participants’ responses on the degree to 
which they apply higher-order reasoning strategies.  In addition, and rare for studies of 
wisdom, the present work uses a sample of counseling professionals and wisdom 
researchers to validate the investigator’s view as to what were wise responses. Moreover, 
the present dissertation examines wisdom-related processes on multiple levels of analysis. 
It addresses macro-level cultural differences and consequences, as well as the micro-level 
individual mechanisms. Finally, the present dissertation used random sampling 
procedures for recruiting subjects in most of the present studies, thus making it more 
likely that the results would have high external validity.  
Does wisdom come with age? 
 The current state of behavioral research on wisdom led to a paradox: on the one 
hand, there is a common lay belief that wisdom comes with age, suggesting age-related 
gains in understanding and resolving social conflicts (e.g. Heckhausen, et al., 1989) . On 
the other hand, research has provided little conclusive evidence corroborating this 
assumption. Instead, substantial evidence demonstrates that cognitive capacities decline 
in old age (Schaie, 1994). Studies 1-2 resolve this paradox by avoiding methodological 
limitations associated with previous work. Past research indicated that older adults are 
more sensitive to their testing environment than younger adults. Specifically, a standard 
laboratory testing environment often induces an aging stereotype threat – a fear that one’s 
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behavior may reinforce a negative stereotype that exists about aging and cognitive 
performance (Hess & Blanchard-Fields, 1999). Further, substantial contextual detail 
provided in the description of a social problem may be essential to wisdom assessment. 
Therefore, Studies 1-2 examine wise aspects of reasoning using naturalistic, context-rich 
materials about social conflicts, and measuring wisdom in a series of structured 
interviews. In these interviews, a community sample read newspaper articles describing a 
series of intergroup (e.g., political power, immigration, natural resources; Study 1) and 
interpersonal conflicts (friends, relatives, spouses; Study 2), and participants were asked 
to reflect on the future development of issues at hand. In addition, Study 3presented the 
coding scheme of wisdom-related processes to a group of professional counselors and 
wisdom researchers, with the expectation that such individuals would endorse my 
judgments of what constituted wise reasoning. 
What are the consequences of wise reasoning? 
 Lay theories suggest that wise people make the “right” decisions throughout their 
life and, consequently, have better lives (Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). Consistent with 
these lay theories, ancient philosophers, as well as modern well-being researchers, have 
proposed that wisdom makes people happy (Aristotle, 1953; Seligman, 2002). Study 4 
examines the relationship between wise reasoning and multiple aspects of well-being, 
including general life satisfaction, social network quality, daily positive and negative 
affect, ruminative brooding, as well as longevity. Furthermore, it addresses the question 
of how aging impacts the relationship between wise reasoning and well-being.  Work by 
Carstensen and colleagues suggests that as people age they develop greater socio-
emotional competence (Charles & Carstensen, 2010). Study 4 builds on this research and 
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tests whether older adults’ tendency to report greater well-being is associated with their 
tendency to reason wisely about social conflicts.  
What role does culture play in wisdom-related processes? 
 Cultures differ in their members’ tendencies to emphasize harmonious 
relationships and encourage behaviors that affirm interdependent social orientation (e.g. 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In particular East Asian cultures endorse these tendencies to 
a greater degree than do North American cultures (e.g. Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, 
& Nisbett, 2010). These findings raise several questions for the study of wisdom-related 
processes. First, these cross-cultural observations suggest that cultures that emphasize 
interpersonal harmony (e.g. Japan) would show greater use of wise reasoning strategies 
when analyzing social conflicts than cultures that promote self-expression (e.g. the U.S.). 
Moreover, observed cultural differences raise the question whether interdependent 
cultures show a development of wisdom across the lifespan similar to that of people from 
Western cultures. The interdependent social orientation of East Asians may result in 
wiser reasoning early on, yet it may also result in less conflict resolution experience over 
time. Thus, the aging gains in wise reasoning may be larger for Americans than for 
Japanese.  In order to address these hypotheses Study 5 replicated Studies 1-2 on a 
diverse, randomly selected sample in Tokyo, Japan.  
Can we facilitate wisdom and if so what are the underlying psychological mechanisms? 
 Some of the features of wisdom have much in common with a holistic mode of 
thought associated with Eastern cultural traditions (Nisbett, 2003) and Eastern 
perspectives on the self (Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007). Specifically, the 
Eastern style of thinking has been characterized by an outside-in phenomenology on the 
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world – looking at social events from a self-distanced or third person perspective. For 
example, various Eastern philosophical traditions such as Buddhism suggest that self-
distancing (or detachment) is a core strategy to obtain greater wisdom. In line with 
philosophical theories, research in social psychology suggests that the ability to maintain 
a distanced perspective on the self has adaptive consequences for how people think and 
feel about negative experiences (Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Kross & Ayduk, 2011). 
Studies 6-7 integrate these theoretical and empirical insights to examine whether 
experimentally cueing participants to adopt a self-distanced view of the world when 
reasoning about future life dilemmas will lead to greater wisdom-related thinking.  
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CHAPTER II 
Studies 1 - 3 – Age and Wisdom 
 Folk psychology holds that people become wiser as they get older (Heckhausen, 
et al., 1989; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Rowley & Slack, 2009), even in the face of 
significant age-related declines in many (but not all) forms of cognitive processing (D. C. 
Park et al., 2002). A sufficient reason for assuming that older people are wiser is that they 
have more life experience, especially experience of social life (Erikson, 1980; Glaser, 
1984; Rowley & Slack, 2009). Moreover, the idea of aging-related gains in wisdom is 
consistent with views of the aging mind in developmental psychology (Baltes, 1993). 
 There are many different views of the nature of wisdom (Sternberg & Jordan, 
2005).  As reviewed in the introduction, there is some consensus that wisdom involves 
the use of certain types of pragmatic reasoning to navigate important challenges of social 
life. Specifically, I propose six wisdom dimensions: 1) perspective shifting from one’s 
own point of view to the point of view of people involved in the conflict; 2) recognition of 
the likelihood of change; 3) prediction flexibility, as indicated by multiple possible 
predictions of how the conflict might unfold; 4) recognition of uncertainty and the limits 
of knowledge; 5) search for conflict resolution and 6) search for a compromise. 
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 In line with lay beliefs, as well as philosophical and psychological theories of 
human development, I expected to find aging gains in wisdom throughout the lifespan by 
avoiding the limitations of the previous work and by examining several aspects of wise 
reasoning using naturalistic, context-rich materials concerning social conflicts, and by 
measuring reasoning in a structured interview with a researcher rather than via written 
materials. Specifically, I presented participants with several stories involving conflicts 
between social groups (Study 1) and between individuals (Study 2). I measured wisdom 
by performing a content analysis of participants’ verbal reflections on possible ways that 
social conflicts might develop. 
Study 1 – Intergroup Conflicts 
 In Study 1, a representative probability sample of young, middle-aged, and older 
adults first performed several cognitive ability tests and next read three newspaper 
articles describing an intergroup conflict with two strong groups opposing each other 
(topics: ethnic tensions; political tensions; natural resources).  
Methods 
Sample 
 Participants were contacted by letter and then by phone 1366 households in 
Washtenaw County, Michigan, of which the two primary cities are Ann Arbor, a 
predominantly middle- and upper-middle-class community, and Ypsilanti, a 
predominantly working-class community. Households were randomly chosen from the 
county phonebook and personalized letters were sent out with the contact information of 
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the Research Center for Group Dynamics inviting them to participate in the study and 
announcing that we would also attempt to contact them by phone. A disproportionate 
stratified sampling was used (Kish, 1965), attempting to include an approximately equal 
number of participants of both sexes, and of each of three age groups (25-39, 40-59, 
60+), as well as an adequate number of lower SES participants (see Table II.1). In order 
to achieve this goal, I oversampled middle-aged male stratum. The overall rate of 
agreement to participate was 57 %. The resulting sample of 247 included proportionally 
more whites and more highly educated people than the U.S. population as a whole but the 
full range of social class - from the nonworking poor to the wealthy - was represented. 
Participants were compensated with $70 for two hours of their participation, which 
included responding to a large number of questions about personal relations and working 
on a variety of cognitive tasks.  
Procedure and Materials 
 Participants were first pre-screened for cognitive impairment using the Mini 
Mental State Exam (impairment cut-off: 26 out of 30), as well as participants’ self-report 
(e.g. Alzheimer’s or brain damage). Eleven subjects were excluded on the basis of 
extremely low cognitive functioning. Following pre-screening for cognitive impairment, 
participants completed several cognitive ability tasks. I measured crystallized or 
knowledge-based intelligence using the comprehension sub-test of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS ; Wechsler, 2008) and I measured speed-related intelligence 
using two processing speed tasks  (Hedden et al., 2002).  
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 In the main part of the study, participants read three alleged newspaper articles 
describing a fictitious intergroup conflict between two equally strong groups from an 
unfamiliar country (Tajikistan, Chuuk, Djibouti; see Appendix A). The topics were 
chosen to be relevant to contemporary social issues, and included ethnic tensions due to 
immigration; political tensions over power, and conflict over natural resources. Because 
the newspaper articles were not real, I first confirmed that our subjects were not familiar 
with the country they read about. None of the subjects indicated that they knew the 
countries well. Because the countries were unfamiliar to our participants and in order to 
ensure that the participants focused on the conflict situation in the articles, the interviewer 
read out loud a summary after participants had read each story, see Table II.2.  
 
Table II.1 – Demographics of the Sample in Studies 1-2: Education, Age, and Gender 
Frequency Study 1 (n=233) 
  
Age Education 
  Gender (n) Range Mean No College Some college  College Post Grad 
Young 
Female (47) 25-40 32.30 4 15 17 11 
Male (42) 25-39 32.57 3 17 10 12 
Middle 
Female (38) 42-58 49.08 5 11 11 11 
Male (35) 41-57 48.58 5 13 9 8 
Old 
Female (39) 60-90 70.15 6 11 17 5 
Male (42) 60-93 70.55 8 8 13 13 
Frequency Study 2 (n=196) 
            Gender (n) 
Age Education 
Range Mean No College Some college  College Post Grad 
Young 
Female (34) 25-40 32.68 3 13 12 6 
Male (35) 25-39 32.54 2 15 8 10 
Middle 
Female (34) 42-58 49.29 5 9 11 10 
Male (29) 41-57 49.00 3 12 8 6 
Old 
Female (33) 60-90 69.79 5 10 13 5 
Male (31) 60-83 68.58 5 8 7 11 
Note: Numbers represent participants without missing data. Due to cognitive impairment or procedural 
error data from 14 participants in Study1 and 4 participants in Study 2 was not included.  
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Table II.2 – Summaries of the Intergroup Conflict Stories Provided in Study 1 
       Topic/Country   Summary 
Ethnic tensions/Tajikistan  Due to the economic growth of Tajikistan many people from 
Kyrgyzstan immigrate to the country. Whereas Kyrgyz people try to 
preserve their customs, Tajiks want Kyrgyz people to assimilate fully 
and abandon their customs.  
Natural resources/Chuuk Huge crude oil resources have been discovered in the economically 
disadvantaged Chuuk state. Due to governmental restrictions many 
interested firms cannot establish the required infrastructure for 
production. On the one side government tries to preserve the ancient 
laws. On the other side, there are also a huge number of people in 
Chuuk who would like to eliminate the regulations entirely. 
Political tensions/Djibouti Two ethnic groups in Djibouti, the Issa and the Afari, have 
completely different perspectives on politics. Whereas one group 
tries to preserve traditions, the other group wants to alter the society 
entirely. Both groups are very strong. 
  
  After each story the interviewer instructed participants to talk about future 
developments of the conflict, guided by three questions in the following order: “What do 
you think will happen after that?”, “Anything else?” and “Why do you think it will 
happen this way?” In case a participant showed difficulty in understanding a question, it 
was repeated without changing the content and/or revealing additional information. 
Participants’ responses were audio-recorded. The majority of structured interviews were 
conducted by hypothesis-blind trained interviewers. Analysis indicated that interviewer’s 
knowledge did not influence participants’ responses (F < 1, ns.).  
Demographics 
 At the end of the study session, participants answered demographic questions. 
Participants were asked their age, education, ethnicity, and occupation (as well as the 
occupation of their significant other). This information was used to obtain an index of 
their socio-economic status. I coded occupations using the International Standard Index 
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of Occupational Status  (ISEI; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). The ISEI scale refers to 
relative job prestige. ISEI job prestige scores are estimated using average level of income 
and education within a specific occupation. I also took into account the occupations of 
significant others. In order to determine the socio-economic status of a participant, the 
higher score of the two (participant and significant other) was used. 
Coding Procedure 
 Participants’ transcripts were masked and the age-related information was 
removed. Two coders were trained on sample materials, until they reached high inter-
rater reliability (r > .9). After extensive training, raters coded participants’ transcripts on 
the six dimensions of wise reasoning on a scale from 1 to 3. Raters were blind to the 
hypothesis, age, gender, and social class of the participants. Overall inter-rater reliability 
was good (.61 < Cohen’s κ < .75), with the disagreement resolved in a group discussion. 
High scores indicated greater wisdom for the dimensions uncertainty, and perspective, 
and low scores indicated greater wisdom for the dimensions compromise, flexibility, 
change, and conflict resolution. See Table II.3 for example responses. Thereafter, the 
obtained ratings were pooled in the same direction (1- not at all to 3 – a great deal). 
Finally, text analysis software (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) counted the number 
of words in each essay. In the interest of parsimony and to enhance the measurement 
reliability, scores across three stories were collapsed (average correlations across 3 
stories: .15 ≤ M(r) ≤ .40). I also created a composite wisdom score by taking the mean 
across the six dimensions (Cronbach’s α = .71).  
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Table II.3 – Responses to the Ethnic Tensions Story, Indicating High / Low Scores 
 Wisdom 
Dimension 
  High score   Low score 
 Compromise They might want to let them continue 
with their ways and maybe at the same 
time maybe try to do some kind of 
promotion to encourage them to better 
assimilate into the culture though, not 
throw away their own culture, but to try 
to make the country more unified, maybe 
bring customs together that might be 
similar for both cultures, in order to 
unify the country. 
I’m sure that each, each culture will keep 
their original customs. It’s not likely that 
someone that’s lived a certain way is 
going to change just because they moved 
to a new area. (…) People are pretty true 
to their nature and they’re not really big 
on change so I’m sure that it won’t be an 
easy thing for them to change their 
culture. 
Perspective-
Shifting 
I think there’ll be friction between those 
two ideas. People do assimilate 
eventually but it often takes a couple 
generations to do that. (…)  There’ll be 
influences both ways but people who are 
in particular countries that receive 
immigrants, they always see it from their 
point of view, namely that these 
immigrants are changing the country. 
They don’t necessarily see it from the 
other point of view. Also, immigrants 
might be upset because their children are 
not the way they would be if they were 
back in their homeland. 
Most likely there is going to be very 
similar things as going on in the United 
States: economic drivers are going to 
want to keep the immigration going and 
traditionalists (…) are going to want to 
stem it and make laws like only speaking 
Tajik, instead of both. It's just like 
“English only.” So I think there is going 
to be a lot of pressure on political stage 
and most likely a new political leader 
from right or left will come up and try to 
fight for or against what's going on.  
 Uncertainty I don’t know. That’s a tough one. I guess 
that’s like what’s going on here with the 
Mexicans that are immigrating here. (…) 
I don’t know too much about the Tajiks 
and their national pride. I don’t know 
how much of that they actually want to 
keep. And I’m sure when the Kyrgyz 
come over they’re acting and speaking 
differently and they don’t want to 
assimilate.  
I say it’s up to them and if you can’t 
speak the language stay at home or get 
the hell out of there. Same as all the 
people coming over here. (…)You got all 
the outsiders coming in and they want to 
change everything. They’re welcome to 
come, but you got to adapt to the ways of 
their country that’s already there. Any 
immigrants should have to adapt to where 
they’re going, not that country adapting to 
the immigrants in my opinion. 
Distraction in Interviews: Going off on a Tangent 
 In addition to the aforementioned wisdom dimensions, coders rated participants’ 
level of distraction when answering the interview questions. Participants’ interviews were 
evaluated with regard to the participant going off on a tangent (1 = “not at all” to 3 = “a 
great deal”). For instance, some participants talked about unrelated subjects without 
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explaining a connection to the interview questions (e.g., interior U.S. politics) or talked 
about unrelated personal life experiences.  
Results 
Age and cognitive abilities  
 In line with most life-span studies of intelligence (Birren & Schaie, 2001; 
Bosworth & Hertzog, 2009; Schaie, 1994), I found aging to be associated with decline in 
fluid IQ, measured by processing speed (dot matching: β = -.49, p = .001; pattern 
matching: β = -.44, p = .001), but not in crystallized IQ, measured by comprehension sub-
test of WAIS (β = .04, t < 1, ns.). In line with research on inhibition deficit of the elderly 
(Hasher, Tonev, Lustig, & Zacks, 2001; Hasher & Zacks, 1988), content analysis of 
interview responses showed that older participants manifested significantly more 
distractibility and inclination to drift from the topic at hand than did younger participants 
(β = .26, t = 4.11, p < .001). The effect of age on distractibility was substantial even when 
response length was controlled (β = .20, t = 3.64, p < .001). 
Age and Wisdom 
 Analyses of wisdom ratings supported the aging hypothesis in this study. Older 
participants scored significantly higher for each wisdom dimension (see Figure II.1) as 
well as for the composite score of wisdom (β = .51, t = 9.21, p < .001). Length of 
response was positively correlated with wisdom (r = .33, p < .001), but the effect of age 
was very substantial even when response length was controlled (β = .52, t = 9.77, p < 
.001).  
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Figure II.1 – The Effect of Age on Wise Reasoning in Study 1 
 
Note: For presentation purposes, age is divided into 3 categories used during participants’ recruitment: 
Young (25-40; n = 89; white), Middle (41-58; n = 73; striped), and Older (60-90; n = 81; black). Higher 
bars indicate higher scores on wisdom-related dimensions. Older participants showed more wisdom than 
younger (t = 10.26, p < .001), and middle-aged adults (t = 7.97, p < .001), whereas the contrast between 
younger and middle–aged adults revealed a marginal trend in the predicted direction (t = 1.71, p = .09).  
 
Unsolicited Advice-giving in Interviews 
 Advice is an important component of wisdom (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Thiele, 
2006). An initial observation of the interviewers was that some participants had a 
tendency to give advice in addition to a descriptive prediction of the future. Therefore, I 
analyzed responses for the amount of advice given (1 = “not at all” to 3 = “a great deal of 
advice;” M = 1.27, SD = .43). This was possible in Study 1, because the instructions in 
this study did not solicit advice. The advice score across the three stories in Study 1 was 
submitted to a general linear model analysis with age as a predictor. Greater age was 
associated with more advice-giving (β = .34, t = 5.52, p = .001). 
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 Study 1 provided some initial support to the hypothesis that greater age is 
associated with greater use of wise reasoning in analysis of social conflicts. However, it 
is not clear if this effect goes beyond analysis of intergroup conflicts. Furthermore, it is 
not clear if such effects translate from the artificial scenarios into real life. In order to test 
this idea, Study 2 focuses on real interpersonal conflicts.  
Study 2 – Interpersonal Conflicts 
      Study 2 investigated age-related thinking in the domain of interpersonal conflict, 
following similar experimental and coding procedures as in Study 1.  
Sample 
 Participants in Study 1 were re-contacted within a year of completing Study 1, 
and invited to participate in a follow-up study having a similar format. I could not reach 
13%; 2 % were reached but declined to participate; see Table II.1. As in Study 1, 
participants received $70 for 2 hours of their participation.  
Procedure and Materials  
 Participants first completed cognitive ability tests, the WAIS Vocabulary and 
WAIS Digit Span Subtests.  In the main part of the study, Participants read these three 
authentic, detailed letters addressed to an advice columnist (“Dear Abby”; see Appendix 
B; letter length: 145-180 words), which described interpersonal conflicts: relational 
conflicts between siblings, friends, and spouses. The interviewer asked participants four 
questions about the further developments of the described relationships: 1) “How did the 
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story develop after this letter;” 2) “Why do you think it happened as you said;” 3) “What 
was the final outcome of this conflict;” 4) “What do you think should be done in 
this  situation.” These questions were more specific than in Study 1, in order to reduce 
participants’ tendency to go off on a tangent. Their responses were audio-recorded. At the 
end of each interview, the interviewer asked the participant a forced-choice question: “In 
the long run, do you see this conflict as a benefit (a) or as an obstacle (b) for the further 
development of relationship?” Note that the questions in Study 2 were more specific (e.g. 
“What will be the final outcome of this conflict?”), which were introduced to reduce the 
amount of distraction. I collapsed these scores across individual stories to form an index 
of distraction in Study 2 (M = 1.03, SD = .13). 
Coding Procedure 
 The same procedure as in Study 1 was followed.  Two hypothesis-blind coders 
judged the use of the six wisdom categories in participants’ transcripts (.52 ≤ Cohen’s κ < 
.98). An index score for each of the six wisdom dimensions was obtained by collapsing 
ratings across three stories (average correlations across 3 stories: .10 ≤ M(r) ≤ .29). 
Composite wisdom scores were created by taking the mean across the six dimensions 
(Cronbach’s α = .56). An additional composite score across both studies (Cronbach’s α = 
.80; r = .30, p < .001) was obtained.  
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Results 
Aging and Cognitive Decline 
 Consistent with Study 1, greater age was associated with lower performance on 
the fluid cognitive ability measure (WAIS digit-span: β = -.17, p = .02), but not with 
crystallized IQ, as measured by the performance on the WAIS vocabulary (β = .06, ns.). I 
did not replicate the effect of age on distractibility measure in Study 2 [F(1,193) < 1, ns.]. 
This might be because the topics in Study 2 were more familiar and the stories contained 
less information. In addition, in order to have fewer participants going off on a tangent, I 
made the questions more specific in Study 2.  
Aging and Wisdom  
 The results indicated that older participants scored significantly higher for each 
wisdom dimension, except conflict resolution and uncertainty (see Figure II.2), and 
scored higher for the composite score of wisdom (β = .21, t = 2.97, p = .003). Replicating 
the results from Study 1, length of response was positively correlated with wisdom (β = 
.22, t = 3.06, p = .003, but the effect of age remained unchanged when response length 
was controlled (β = .22, t = 3.13, p = .002). In Study 2, the interviewer also noted whether 
the participant spontaneously mentioned a contextual “it depends” statement instead of 
answering in line with the two categories provided. The number of stories in which 
participant made an “it depends” statement was taken as a measure of outcome 
contextualism (M = .36, SD = .67). There was a marginally significant tendency for older 
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participants to provide more responses indicating outcome contextualism than younger 
participants (β = .12, t = 1.73, p = .06).  
Figure II.2 – The Effect of Age on Wise Reasoning in Study 2 
 
Note: Age in 3 categories: Young (n = 69; white), Middle (n = 73; n = 63; striped), and Older (n = 64; 
black). Older participants showed more wisdom than younger (t = 3.54, p < .001), and middle-aged adults 
(t = 3.05, p = .003); the contrast between younger and middle–aged adults was not significant (t = .41, ns.). 
 
Wise Reasoning across Studies 1-2 
 I explored the effects of age on the aggregate wisdom score across both studies 
(Cronbach’s α across all scores = .8). As Figure II.3 illustrates, the overall effect of age 
was substantial (β = .52, t = 9.09, p < .001), with older people being significantly 
overrepresented among the top 20 % on wisdom performance. The average age of the 
participants in the top 20% was 64.90 years; the average age of participants in the bottom 
80% was 45.46 years.  
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Figure II.3 – Age Distribution of Top-performers on Wise Reasoning
 
Analyses with Covariates: IQ, Length of the Response, Gender, and Socio-Economic 
Status  
 Next, I examined the association between wisdom and several demographic and 
cognitive variables. Men and women did not differ in aggregate wisdom (β = -.001, t < 1, 
ns.). Fluid IQ was negatively related to wisdom in Study 1 (β = -.19, t = 2.96, p = .007), 
but this was due solely to the fact that the older participants had lower fluid IQs (with age 
as a covariate: β = .09, t = 1.42, ns.). Crystallized IQ was positively and non-trivially 
related to wisdom in Study 2 (β = .27, t = 3.96, p < .001).  
 Simultaneously entering SES, education, and IQ in regression indicated that age 
and crystallized IQ remained significant predictors of wisdom (see Table II.4). This latter 
analysis is particularly important because it establishes that the age effects on wisdom 
hold at every level of social class, education, and IQ level. In contrast, neither SES nor 
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educational attainment contributed to wisdom over and above the fact that participants 
with higher SES have higher IQ (IQcrystallized: r = .28, p < .001; IQfluid: r = .21, p = .002) 
and participants with higher education have higher IQ (IQcrystallized: r = .36, p < .001; 
IQfluid: r = .29, p = .002).  
Table II.4 – Regression Analyses with Age, Cognitive Abilities and Demographics across 
Studies 1-2  
Model IVs Study 1+2 Regression βs 
COM UN FLEX PER CH RES WIS 
I  Age .37
***
 .15
*
 .34
***
 .42
***
 .36
***
 .23
**
 .51
***
 
II Age .36*** .24** .40*** .46*** .37*** .27*** .58*** 
C.IQ .11 .10 .18* -.08 .20** .19* .20** 
F.IQ .01 .17
†
 .08 .07 .01 .08 .12 
SES .10 -.01 -.05 -.04 .02 .05 .02 
Education -.08 .019 .16* .19* -.01 -.03 .07 
Note: C.IQ = Crystallized IQ; F.IQ = Fluid IQ; R/Length = Length of the Response; COM = Search for a 
Compromise; UN = Uncertainty/Recognition of Limits of Knowledge; FLEX = Flexibility in Predicted 
Outcomes; PER = Perspective of People in the Conflict; CH = Prediction of Change; RES = Search for 
Conflict Resolution; WIS = Composite Wisdom Score. ***p ≤  .001. **p ≤ .01. *p ≤ .05. †p ≤ .1. 
 
Wisdom of Academics vs. Non-academic Professionals 
 One of the research sites in Studies 1-2 was located in Ann Arbor, MI – a 
community with a large percentage of academics. Could it be that older academics 
produced the aging effect in our studies? In order to control for this possibility, I 
conducted an analysis with age and profession (1 = “academic” vs. -1 = “non-academic”) 
among participants with post-graduate education. Comparing the composite wisdom 
scores of academics vs. non-academics in Study 1 (n = 12 vs. n = 44) and Study 2 (n = 8 
vs. n = 37), I found that academics (Study 1: M = 1.65, SD = .27; Study 2: M = 1.67, SD 
= .23) and non-academic post-graduates (Study 1: M = 1.72, SD = .37; Study 2: M = 1.57, 
SD = .21) did not differ in wisdom (Study 1: F(1,54) < 1, ns.; Study 2: F(1,43) = 1.45, 
ns.). Next, controlling for occupation (academic vs. non-academic), greater age remained 
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a significant predictor of greater wisdom (Study 1: β = .58, t = 5.12, p < .001; Study 2: β 
= .35, t = 2.44, p = .02).  
Distractibility and Wisdom 
 Previous research by Hasher and colleagues suggests that distractibility may be 
associated with broader attention and can be adaptive when distracting information 
becomes relevant (Healey, Campbell, & Hasher, 2008; Kim, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007). 
Could broader attention processing contribute to more wisdom among the elderly? I 
addressed this question by performing a series of regression analyses on the composite 
scores of distractibility and wisdom across both studies. The results indicated that 
distractibility was positively associated with wisdom (β = .20, t = 2.87, p = .005). A 
linear regression with wisdom scores as a dependent variable and age and distractibility 
as predictors indicated a significant effect of age (β = .46, t = 7.22, p < .001), and a 
marginally significant effect of distractibility (β = .11, t = 1.65, p = .10). The reduction in 
the effect of distractibility after controlling for age differences was statistically 
significant, as indicated by the Sobel test (Sobel = 2.62, SE = .03, p =.008). 
Study 3 – Expert Validation 
 Is it possible that the present operational definition of wisdom was idiosyncratic? 
To address this question, I consulted experts on wisdom – researchers working on this 
topic, as well as counseling professionals – to examine whether their definition of a wise 
response overlaps with the coding scheme in the first two studies. 
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Methods 
Sample 
 I contacted members of the “Defining Wisdom Research Network” at the 
University of Chicago - a large scale collaboration and news platform for researchers and 
professionals interested in wisdom research (N = 543). I first verified the entries in the 
network database, focusing on wisdom-related research fields and members with high 
levels of professional expertise in domains of legal, economic, or psychological 
consulting (N = 386). Next, I identified those members of the network who were 
researchers with post-graduate degrees, as well as those who were executives of large 
companies, inviting them to participate in a short survey on wisdom (N = 327). One 
hundred forty-one agreed to participate in the study (Mage = 50.35; SDage = 12.70; see 
Tables II.5 - II.6 for further demographics).  
Procedure 
 I randomly selected a set of four responses to each of the stories presented in 
Studies 1-2 (24 responses in total) and asked the expert group to evaluate the wisdom of 
these responses, using a procedure similar to that used by Baltes (Baltes, Staudinger, 
Maercker, & Smith, 1995). Two of these responses were randomly chosen from the pool 
of participants who scored one SD above the mean wisdom score (SD plus) for the story. 
The other two responses were chosen from the pool of participants who scored one SD 
below the mean (SD minus) of the story. Therefore, each individual was presented with 
four responses to the same story. 
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Table II.5 – Demographics of the Wisdom Expert Sample: Gender, Geographic Location, 
Ethnicity, and Occupations 
 Demographic Variable Frequency (%) 
Gender 35♀ 
Geographic location   
North America 77 
South America 1 
Australia 2 
East/South-East Asia  5 
Eastern Europe 2 
Western Europe 15 
Ethnicity   
  Caucasian 81 
  African American  1 
  Asian/Asian American 8 
  Latino  1 
  Middle Eastern 2 
  Others 8 
Occupations   
University professor 52 
Post-graduate researcher 18 
Independent researcher 6 
CEO/Director/Managerial 12 
Consultant 6 
Law 1 
Others 5 
Note: Numbers represent participants without missing data. Information from 16 participants was missing 
due to technical errors when filling out the on-line survey or because participants decided not to provide 
this information.  
Table II.6 – Academics by Research Area in Study 3 
 Academic Field Frequency (%) 
Anthropology 1% 
Biology 4% 
Business/Finance 3% 
Education 11% 
Human Development 7% 
Health 3% 
Information Sciences 4% 
Law 3% 
Leadership/Organizational Behavior 4% 
Liberal arts 6% 
Neuroscience 3% 
Philosophy 24% 
Psychology 17% 
Religious studies/Theology 4% 
Social Work 1% 
Sociology 6% 
Note: Numbers represent participants without missing data. Information from 32 participants was missing 
due to technical errors when filling out the on-line survey or because participants decided not to provide 
this information. 
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 Participants completed the study on-line (using DatStat Illume
TM
 4.7 survey 
platform), guided by written instructions, which informed them that the study they were 
about to participate in explored wisdom of four responses to a newspaper story describing 
either a societal or an interpersonal conflict. Next, participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of the six newspaper stories and the set of four responses to these stories. Half of 
the experts were presented with the following order of the responses: first SD plus 
response, followed by first SD minus response, second SD plus response, and second SD 
minus response. The other half of the participants were presented with these responses in 
reversed order. Follow-up analyses indicated that order of the presentation did not 
influence the results (F < 1, ns.). After reading the four responses, they were asked, 
which of them was the wisest. Next, participants indicated which of the responses was the 
least wise. Finally, they indicated which one was the wisest response among the 
remaining two transcripts. At the end of this study, participants provided additional 
demographics: age, gender, geographic location, ethnicity, and occupation (Table II.5). 
Furthermore, academics also indicated their field of research (Table II.6).   
Results 
 The analyses indicated that the professional counselors and wisdom researchers 
agreed with the coders in the first two studies. Overall, they ranked the two “high-score” 
responses as being significantly wiser than the two “low-score” responses [F(1,140) = 
94.98, p < .001]. The predicted pattern was significant for five out of six stories (ps < 
.005). The results of expert ratings for the spousal conflict story did not show a 
significant difference between the responses 1 SD above and below the mean on our 
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wisdom ratings (F(1,27) < 1, ns.). The overall pattern of results didn’t change when this 
story was excluded from the omnibus analysis (β = .45, t = 7.80, p < .001). 
Discussion 
 The results of the three studies presented in this chapter provide some support the 
proposed model of wise reasoning in two ways. First, wisdom experts gave  high wisdom 
marks to  responses of participants who scored high on the six aspects of wise reasoning 
proposed in this dissertation: perspective shifting from one’s own point of view to the 
point of view of people involved in the conflict; recognition of the likelihood of change; 
prediction flexibility, as indicated by multiple possible predictions of how the conflict 
might unfold; recognition of uncertainty and the limits of knowledge; search for conflict 
resolution search for a compromise. Second, Studies 1-2 suggest wisdom gains in older 
age, which is consistent with several theoretical models of wisdom development 
(Erikson, 1980, 1984; Maslow, 1968).  Using a large, randomly selected sample in two 
studies looking at societal and interpersonal conflicts I found that older Americans made 
more use of proposed wise reasoning schemes when talking about social conflicts than 
young and middle-aged Americans.  These findings document that despite the well-
established cognitive declines in fluid intelligence associated with old age (Birren & 
Schaie, 2001; Hasher, et al., 2001; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; D. C. Park, et al., 2002; 
Schaie, 1994), reasoning about social conflicts improves. Moreover, my results indicate 
that wisdom gains occur mainly between middle and old age.  
 It is important to note that one unique aspect of the present studies is the focus on 
naturalistic, context-rich materials concerning social conflicts. Another key aspect deals 
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with the naturalistic setting of a structured interview. These methodological 
considerations are important, and consistent with some philosophical and lay theories, 
suggesting that wisdom is oriented towards resolving problems in a social context 
(Sowarka, 1989; Sternberg, 2004).  
 An important question concerns the limits of wisdom of the elderly. Are the old 
still wise when the social dilemma requires a great amount of emotional involvement? In 
other words, does psychological distance (Liberman & Trope, 2008) act as a moderator 
of wisdom? It is possible that self-immersion in the problem and the associated emotional 
involvement (Kross & Ayduk, 2011) might impair the judgment of older people more 
than that of younger people. On the other hand, the elderly may chronically self-distance 
from the social conflict more than younger counterparts and be less emotionally affected 
when reasoning about social life dilemmas. The proposed distancing mechanism is 
experimentally tested in the Chapter V of the present dissertation. Further, I elaborate on 
these boundary conditions in greater detail in the general discussion.   
 Another important question deals with the consequences of the wise reasoning 
strategies. Theorists in philosophy and human development have frequently 
conceptualized wisdom as an optimal level of human development. If so, one would 
expect wise reasoning to have adaptive consequences. This notion stands in contrast to 
empirical observations about other types of cognitive abilities, that are unrelated to 
individual well-being, and which decline over the lifespan. Can it be that wisdom and not 
intelligence contributes towards greater well-being in older age? I address this hypothesis 
in the next chapter, focusing on multiple aspects of individual well-being and longevity. 
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CHAPTER III 
Study 4 – Wise Reasoning, Intelligence and Well-being 
 Scholars since at least the time of Aristotle have been interested in the sources of 
well-being. Over the last 50 years, psychologists have conducted a large number of 
studies exploring subjective well-being, which includes people’s emotional responses and 
global judgments of life satisfaction (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999). Some of the 
major findings in this literature have detailed the effects of socio-demographic factors 
such as marriage or unemployment on subjective well-being (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & 
Smith, 1999).  
 The relationship between reasoning and well-being has also been explored; 
however these studies have revealed inconclusive results. On one hand, people who 
report greater well-being believe that they have superior reasoning abilities (Campbell, 
Converse, & Rogers, 1976; Diener & Fujita, 1995). On the other hand, studies in 
Germany (Wirthwein & Rost, 2011), Norway (Watten, Syversen, & Myhrer, 1995), and 
the U.S. (Sigelman, 1981) have shown no relationship between standard measures of 
intelligence and subjective well-being. However, standard intelligence tests don’t 
necessarily measure people’s ability to think about social relations (e.g. Sternberg, 1999) 
and real-world decision-making (e.g. Stanovich, 2009), and thus may underestimate 
actual abilities (Carraher, Carraher, & Schliemann, 1985).  
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A number of  cross-sectional and longitudinal studies also indicate that fluid 
cognitive abilities such as working memory decline over adulthood (e.g. D. C. Park, et 
al., 2002), yet older adults report greater well-being than their younger counterparts (e.g. 
Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). 
Theoretically, it is possible that the recognition of one's own limitations triggers greater 
allocation of resources to the interpersonal domain that is more important in older age 
(Charles & Carstensen, 2010). This shift in resource allocation may result in greater 
social sensitivity and adaptation to strategies that maintain interpersonal harmony (Baltes, 
1993), and that enhance one’s well-being. 
Integrating these lines of work, I propose that superior reasoning may in fact be 
related to well-being, but that it is pragmatic reasoning strategies
 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985) that are influenced by life experiences and situated in a social context which are 
relevant for subjective well-being. Specifically, I focus on a set of strategies that I have 
previously identified as ‘wise.’ Little if any work has directly tested the relationship 
between wise reasoning and well-being. The only two known studies that examined this 
question were conducted within the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm. However, these studies 
showed inconsistent results. In one study  wiser reasoning about social conflicts was 
related to life-satisfaction, but not related to people’s emotional responses (Mickler & 
Staudinger, 2008). In the other study wise reasoning was negatively related to emotional 
responses in general (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003). Unfortunately, as I discussed earlier, 
the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm has several methodological shortcomings, including rather 
abstract descriptions of personal problems, which provided little contextual information.  
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 In order to address the relationship between wise reasoning and well-being, I 
measured reasoning about real world dilemmas and various indicators of well-being. In 
order to void the limitations of previous work, I examined wise reasoning using 
naturalistic, context-rich materials concerning social conflicts, and by examining 
reasoning in a structured interview with a researcher. In addition, I addressed the question 
of how aging impacts wise reasoning and well-being. Building on Studies 1-2, I predicted 
that older adults would show greater well-being, because they are wiser than younger 
adults when reasoning about social conflicts. 
Methods 
Sample 
 Participants from Studies 1-2 were invited to participate in a further study on 
reasoning and personality.  
Well-being and Longevity  
 Participants completed a set of questionnaires measuring their well-being and 
associated emotion regulation tendencies. Participants recalled ten mundane events 
during the preceding two days, reporting positive and negative affect. Scores were 
collapsed across situations. Participants answered a life satisfaction question “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” on a 10 point 
scale with 1 = “not at all” and 10 = “very much satisfied” (a common technique in well-
being research; Kahneman, et al., 1999). Following previous research (Fiori, Antonucci, 
& Akiyama, 2008), participants reported their relationship satisfaction by specifying 
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network members providing social support and those causing annoyances, with the 
proportion of supportive vs. detrimental relationships taken as an index of social network 
quality. I measured depressive brooding using the 4-item Brooding subscale of the 
Ruminative Response Scale α = .69 (e.g., think ‘What am I doing to deserve this?’; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). I explored how participants construed 
social conflicts, analyzing percentage of positive relative to negative words contained in 
their narratives. Past research indicates that this measure reliably predicts  self-reported 
emotional well-being and individual health outcomes (Pennebaker, 1997). Finally, 
because subjective well-being is a strong predictor of longevity (Chida & Steptoe, 2008), 
I explored how wise reasoning relates to longevity five years after completion of Study 1 
by examining publicly available death records.  
Discriminant Measures: Cognitive Abilities and Personality 
 Given the novelty of the present measure of wise reasoning, I additionally tested 
psychometric properties of the proposed model of wise reasoning, focusing on its 
discriminant validity via its relationships to cognitive abilities and personality traits. Data 
on cognitive abilities came from Studies 1-2. The Big-Five personality dimensions were 
measured using the Ten Item Personality Measure (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann Jr, 
2003), which has adequate convergence with other Big-Five personality measures. 
Control Variables: Health and Social Class 
Perceived health was measured with a 3-item health questionnaire (e.g. 
"Compared to other people your own age, how would you rate your physical health?"; 
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Hedden, et al., 2002;  α = .78). Participants also provided demographic information 
including their age, education, level of income, and occupation. I coded participants’ 
occupations using the International Socioeconomic Index of Occupational Status 
(Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses: Inter-item Correlations and Factor Extraction 
 Results from exploratory analyses are summarized in Table III.1. All pair-wise 
correlations of wise reasoning dimensions were significant except for limits of knowledge 
being unrelated to change and conflict resolution (mean r = .25). Principal component 
analyses and a screeplot provided evidence for a single factor, which accounted for over 
38 % of the variance. An alternative two-factor solution yielded highly correlated factors 
(r = .67), with the second factor explaining comparable amount of variance as each of the 
six items by itself (17%). 
Table III.1 – Factor Loadings for the Six Wisdom Dimensions, and Dimension Inter-
correlations 
  Inter-correlations 
 Factor 
Loadings 
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. change .56 .23*** .23*** .26*** .38*** .03 
2. compromise .70 - .44*** .35*** .27*** .14* 
3. flexibility .76  - .35*** .25*** .43*** 
4. perspective .64   - .17** .17** 
5. resolution .55    - .03 
6. limits of knowledge .44     - 
Note.***p ≤  .001. **p ≤ .01. *p ≤ .05. 
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Discriminant Relations with Cognitive Abilities and Personality 
As shown in Table III.2, WAIS-vocabulary scores were positively correlated with 
wise reasoning, whereas speed of processing was negatively correlated with wise 
reasoning (an artifact of older participants having lower processing speed). Among the 
Big Five factors, only agreeableness was positively related to wise reasoning. The 
positive associations were modest in size (the two largest betas were .27 and .25), 
suggesting that wise reasoning is associated with crystallized cognitive abilities and some 
personality traits, but is distinct from these constructs. Wise reasoning was not related to 
neuroticism, suggesting that it is distinct from affective personality characteristics.  
Relations with Well-being 
 Table III.2 indicates a significant association between wise reasoning and a wide 
range of well-being indicators. Participants who scored high on wise reasoning reported 
less negative affect in daily life, better relationship quality, greater life satisfaction, less 
tendency to brood, and a more positive emotional construal of social conflicts, but not 
more positive affect in daily life. Importantly, including wise reasoning in the model 
significantly improved the fit of regression models for each well-being indicator except 
for positive affect, as indicated by the difference
1
 in R
2 
between Models I and II, 
explaining additional variance above and beyond the variance explained by socio-
economic factors (education, occupation, income) and subjective health (see Table III.3). 
In contrast to wise reasoning, neither fluid nor crystallized cognitive abilities were related 
to any of the well-being indicators (mean rfluid = -.06; mean rfluid = -.01), with the 
                                                          
1
 Model II R
2 
significance level indicates the significance of the R
2
-change between two models. 
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exception of a negative relationship between crystallized abilities and positive affect (r = 
-.22, p < .001).  
Table III.2 – The Relationship between Wise Reasoning, Well-being, as well as Analytic 
Abilities and Personality 
 Wise Reasoning 
Relation to well-being 
Life-satisfaction 
Positive affect 
Negative affect (reverse-scored) 
Relationship quality 
Depressive brooding (reverse-scored) 
Emotional Construal 
 .17* 
-.08 
 .26*** 
 .25*** 
 .33*** 
 .19** 
Discriminant validity 
Analytic abilities 
  Speed of processing 
  WAIS Digitspan 
  WAIS Comprehension 
  WAIS Vocabulary 
 
-.25*** 
 .01 
 .08 
 .25*** 
Big Five personality dimensions 
  Neuroticism  
  Extraversion 
  Openness 
  Agreeableness 
  Conscientiousness 
 
-.15 
-.06 
 .06 
 .27** 
 .12 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients. Personality measures were assessed via a mailed questionnaire 2 years 
upon completion of the laboratory sessions, leading to an attrition (n= 104). ***p ≤  .001.**p ≤ .01.*p ≤ .05. 
 
Table III.3 – Regression Analyses with Socio-economic Factors and Health (Model I), 
and Addition of Wise Reasoning (Model II) Predicting Well-being 
 
Model LS 
n = 144 
POS 
n = 222 
NEG 
n = 222 
RQ 
n = 166 
EMO 
n = 221 
RUM 
n = 185 
I Occupational prestige -.08 -.23** .04 -.05 -.07 -.01 
Education (years) .10 -.03 .07 .06 .04 .02 
Income (log) .03 -.01 -.04 -.09 .13
†
 -.12 
 Health .21* .24*** .23*** .17* .07 .29*** 
 R
2
 .05 .09*** .07** .04 .02 .10** 
II Occupational prestige -.10 -.22** .01 -.08 -.09 -.04 
 Education (years) .09 -.03 .06 .05 .03 .01 
 Income (log) .03 -.01 -.04 -.10 .12
†
 -.12
†
 
 Health .20* .24*** .22** .16* .06 .27*** 
 Wise reasoning .16
†
 -.06 .23*** .24** .19** .32*** 
 R
2
 .08
†
 .10 .13*** .10** .06** .20*** 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients. POS = positive affect; NEG = less negative affect; RQ = relationship 
quality; LS = life satisfaction; RUM = less rumination; EMO = positive emotional construal. Life 
satisfaction was assessed via a survey a year upon completion of the experimental sessions, thus smaller N 
***p ≤ .001. **p ≤ .01. *p ≤ .05. † p ≤ .1 
43 
 
Longevity 
The results of logistic regression with wise reasoning and age as predictors, and 
longevity (1 = “dead” vs. 0 = “alive”) as the dependent variable showed significant 
effects of age [B = .07, SE = .03, Wald(df = 1) = 13.93, p < .001], and a marginally 
significant effect of wisdom on longevity [B = -2.31, SE = 1.43, Wald (df = 1) = 2.60, p = 
.10]. Subsequent analysis with addition of socio-demographic factors (education, 
occupation, income) and subjective health  as predictors suggested that the effect of wise 
reasoning on longevity five years later was even stronger when socio-demographic 
factors were controlled [B = -5.36, SE = 2.06, Wald (df = 1) = 6.79, p < .01].  
Age, Wisdom, and Wellbeing 
  I subsequently examined whether wise reasoning mediates the relationship 
between age and composite well-being by performing a series of multiple regression 
analyses
2
. As Figure III.1 illustrates, in each case the conditions for establishing 
mediation according to Shrout and Bolger (2002) were met. Specifically, age was 
positively related to wise reasoning, and both of these variables were related to well-
being. Importantly, the results of a bootstrapping test (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) indicated 
that controlling for wise-reasoning significantly attenuated the relationship between age 
and well-being (see Figure III.1 for 95% Confidence Intervals generated by the 
                                                          
2
 Preliminary analyses indicated that positive affect was not related to other well-being indicators 
(mean r = .09; PCA loading on the well-being factor = .28). Therefore, it was not included in the 
omnibus analyses.  
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bootstrapping test for each mediation analysis). These findings demonstrate that wise-
reasoning partially mediated the association between age and well-being.  
Figure III.1 – Path Analysis Examining the Role that Wise Reasoning Plays in Mediating 
the Effect of Age on Well-being 
 
 Finally, I conducted a mixed-model analysis with mean-centered age, wise 
reasoning, and their interactions as between subject predictors and z-transformed well-
being indicators as a within-subject variable. The results showed a significant effect of 
age (B = .01, SE = .003, t = 3.05, p < .005), wise reasoning (B = .62, SE = .236, t = 2.61, 
p = .01), and their interaction (B = .03, SE = .013, t = 2.07. p = .04), such that the positive 
relationship between wise reasoning and well-being was stronger for older adults than for 
younger adults
3
. Subsequent moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 
2007) indicated that the age wisdom  well-being path model was significant for 
middle-aged (βb = .18, Sobel Z = 2.25, p < .05) and older adults (βb = .37, Sobel Z = 3.94, 
p < .001), but not for younger adults (βb = -.01, Sobel Z = -.10, ns.). 
                                                          
3
 Comparable analyses with gender and wise reasoning predicting well-being showed a significant 
effect of wise reasoning on well-being (B = 1.02, SE = .282, t = 3.61. p < .001), but no significant 
effects of gender (B = .05, SE = .079, t = .59, ns.) nor a gender X wise reasoning interaction (B = .17, 
SE = .390, t = .44, ns.). 
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Figure III.2 – Simple Plot Effect of Wise Reasoning on Well-being at 1 SD above/below 
Age Mean 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with prior research, fluid and crystallized cognitive abilities were not 
related to well-being. In contrast, the ability to reasoning wisely about social conflicts 
was positively related to greater global life satisfaction, greater satisfaction with social 
relationships, less negative affect in daily life, a relatively positive construal of social 
conflicts, a lower propensity to brood, and greater longevity. Importantly, wise reasoning 
was not related to greater positive affect in daily life. The latter finding suggests that 
people who reason wisely are more content without having unusually high positive affect 
in daily life. Moreover, the relationship between wise reasoning and well-being was 
highly robust. Wise reasoning explained a greater amount of variance in individual well-
being than did gender or various socio-economic indicators. I also observed two age-
related patterns. First, the link between wise reasoning and well-being was somewhat 
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stronger among older adults. Second, for middle-aged and older adults wise reasoning 
mediated the age-related differences in well-being. 
The present results suggest that lay beliefs about the relationship between 
reasoning abilities and well-being are correct, with one caveat. Whereas wise reasoning 
about social conflicts contributes to well-being, cognitive abilities in general do not. 
Psychologists have long sought to identify strategies to reliably improve well-being (e.g. 
Kahneman, et al., 1999; Seligman, 2002). The observation that wise reasoning improves 
into old age (Studies 1-2)  suggests that wise reasoning is a malleable construct and thus 
it may be possible to train people to reason wisely in daily life.  
The present work examined psychological processes associated with wisdom 
(aging, and well-being) in the North-American cultural context. However, the growing 
body of literature in cultural psychology suggests that cultures vary considerably on the 
dimensions relevant for the discussion of wisdom-related processes (Kitayama & Uskul, 
2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Western cultures place a greater emphasis on 
independence of the self and, correspondingly, value active personal goal pursuit, self-
determination, and working through possible social conflicts. In contrast, East Asian 
cultures place a greater emphasis on interdependence of the self with significant others. 
Correspondingly, these cultures value social harmony, fitting in to social norms and role 
expectations (Morling & Evered, 2006), and conflict avoidance strategies (Ohbuchi & 
Takahashi, 1994). Do these macro-level cultural differences in value of interpersonal 
harmony have an impact on wisdom acquisition across the lifespan? In the next chapter, I 
explore this question by extending the study of wise reasoning to Japan.  
47 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Study 5 – Age and Wisdom: Culture Matters 
 The results from the previous studies of this dissertation indicate that older 
Americans are wiser than younger Americans in analysis of social conflicts, which is 
consistent with widespread beliefs about wisdom (Erikson, 1984). However, cultures 
differ in the ways they approach social conflicts (Triandis, 1989). East Asian cultures 
encourage interpersonal harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) and 
avoidance of conflicts (Leung, 1988; Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994) more than Western 
cultures and much of socialization is oriented towards this end. Thus, social orientation of 
East Asians may result in wiser reasoning early on, but also result in less conflict 
resolution experience over time. If so, one would expect younger East Asians to think 
more wisely about social conflicts than younger Americans, yet one would expect larger 
age gains in wise reasoning among Americans than East Asians. Study 5 tested this 
possibility by performing interviews of random samples of Japanese (N = 186), who 
reflected on the social issues in a similar vein as American participants in Studies 1-2.  
Methods 
Sample 
 A random sampling procedure was used to recruit age-stratified community 
sample of Japanese in the Tokyo Metropolitan area. Names were randomly selected from 
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a municipal registry, oversampling low educated adults. The resulting sample included an 
approximately equal number of participants of both sexes, and of each of three age 
groups (25-39, 40-59, 60-75), as well as an adequate number of adults from lower socio-
economic strata approximated by level of education and occupational prestige 
(Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). In Japan, a survey company contacted participants first 
and gave them a survey composed of demographic questionnaires. Participants responded 
to the survey at home and mailed it back. Participants who responded to the survey were 
further invited to participate in subsequent lab sessions, similar to the U.S. procedure. 
The overall rate of participation agreement for the initial session was 53%. Participants 
were compensated with 7,000 yen per each of the 2h individual experimental session. For 
each session participants completed a large battery of social and cognitive measures. 
Because Japanese sample ranged between 25 and 75, an equivalent sub-sample of 
Americans from Studies 1-2 was selected for further cross-cultural analyses. 
Cognitive Tasks 
 I measured crystallized or knowledge-based intelligence using the Japanese 
equivalent of the comprehension and vocabulary subtests of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale, and I measured fluid or working-memory and speed-related 
intelligence using the Japanese equivalent of the digit span subtest of WAIS and two 
tasks designed to test speed on processing in East Asian and Western cultures (Hedden, et 
al., 2002). The two crystallized tasks were highly correlated, r = .47, p < .001, thus z-
transformed and collapsed into a single index. Because culture-normed measures of 
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crystallized abilities were used, analysis for crystallized abilities was performed 
separately for each culture. 
Interviews 
 The procedure in this Study was identical to the one described in Studies 1-2. All 
materials were back translated into Japanese (Brislin, 1970). The American names of the 
characters in the interpersonal conflict scenarios were replaced with equally common 
Japanese names. In two sessions participants read a series of newspaper articles 
describing intergroup and interpersonal conflicts. Intergroup conflicts involved fictitious 
scenarios such as a story about crude oil discovery at the shore of a poor Pacific island, 
with a debate among the islanders whether foreign investors should be let in. 
Interpersonal conflicts involved actual letters to an advice columnist. For instance, 
friends conflicts described how a friend of a married couple was forced by each spouse to 
take his/her side. Participants were asked: ”What do you think will happen after that?” 
and “Why do you think it will happen this way?”  Participants took on average 40 
minutes for each interview session, similar to the American participants in earlier studies. 
None of the subjects indicated prior familiarity with the scenarios or countries they read 
about. Wisdom-related reasoning was measured by performing a content analysis of 
participants’ verbal reflections on possible ways that social conflicts might develop, using 
the same six reasoning schemata as in earlier studies: 1) perspective shifting from one’s 
own point of view to the point of view of people involved in the conflict; 2) recognition of 
the likelihood of change; 3) prediction flexibility, as indicated by multiple possible 
predictions of how the conflict might unfold; 4) recognition of uncertainty and the limits 
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of knowledge; 5) search for conflict resolution and 6) recognition of conflicting points of 
view and search for a compromise.  
 After transcribing and removing age-related information, trained hypothesis-blind 
coders who were also blind to the age of the subjects coded the overall response for each 
story on the six wisdom-related schemata. I established cross-cultural equivalence by 
having one rater from each culture code random samples of 50 translated responses from 
another culture, and comparing the agreement rate (r > .90), resolving discrepancies in a 
group discussion. 
Results 
Cognitive Abilities and Distractibility 
 Similar to the Americans, Japanese older adults scored lower on fluid cognitive 
abilities across all tasks (dot matching: r = -.53, p < .001; r. = -.61, p < .001; WAIS 
digitspan: r = -.37, p < .001), but not with crystallized abilities, r = -.03, ns. Importantly, 
neither young [F(1,163) = 1.14, ns.] nor older [F(1,163) = 1.50, ns.] adults differed in 
fluid abilities across cultures. Further, older Japanese were also more distracted and had 
an inclination to drift from the topic at hand than did than younger Japanese, as revealed 
by content analysis of interview responses (r = .22, p < .005). Finally, older Japanese also 
talked significantly more than younger and middle-aged Japanese (r = .21, p = .004). 
Wise Reasoning 
 Length of response, as quantified by the number of sentences, was positively 
correlated with wisdom scores (e.g. flexibility: r = .24, p = .001; perspective-taking: r 
= .29, p < .001], and therefore it was regressed out, performing subsequent analyses on 
wisdom residuals across all types of conflict (Cronbach’s α = .61).  
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Figure IV.1 – Wise Reasoning Across Age-groups in Japan and the U.S.  
 
Note: Each bar represents a T-score (M = 50, SD = 10) of composite wise reasoning (mean of standardized 
scores across 6 categories) on a full sample. Error bars represent standard error. 
  
 As Figure IV.1 illustrates, there were age differences in wisdom in the U.S. 
[F(1,166) = 54.90, p < .001), but not in Japan [F(1,141) < 1, ns.; culture X age 
interaction: F(1,307) = 30.48, p < .001]. The culture X age interaction was significant for 
each aspect of wise reasoning [4.73 < Fs ≤ 30.42, ps < .05], except for uncertainty 
[F(1,336) < 1, ns. ], see Table IV.1. Younger and middle-aged Japanese scored 
significantly higher than their American counterparts [F25-40(1,117) = 66.89, p < .001; 
F41-59(1,102) = 41.27, p < .001], yet this cultural difference was not found for older 
participants [F60-75(1,86) = 2.29, ns.]. Looking at scenarios separately, Japanese scored 
consistently higher on wise reasoning about each scenario than Americans (16.45 < Fs < 
48.29; ps < .001), except for the politics story, which indicated a predicted non-
significant trend [F(1,154) = 1.93, p = .17]. Conflict resolution was an exception to the 
overall cultural pattern, with Americans of all ages (M = 52.67, SE = .49) mentioning it 
more often than Japanese [M = 46.73, SE = .53; F(1,336) = 65.56, p < .001].  
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 Overall men did not score differently from women (F < 2.29, ns.). Finally, wise 
reasoning was positively associated with education, occupational prestige and crystallized 
IQ (Table IV.1), but controlling for these variables did not change the age-wisdom results 
(rpartial=-.05, ns.). 
Table IV.1 – Aging, Wisdom, and Culture: Descriptives, Zero-order Correlations, and 
Regression Analysis 
  M (SD)/ % CH COM FLEX PER RES UN WIS 
Japan Gender  53.2 %♀ .12 -.08 -.12 -.09 .02 -.21** -.12 
n=186 Age 46.98 (14.01) -.22
**
 .06 -.08 .00 -.01 .02 -.07 
 Age group 
 25-40 
 41-59 
 60-79 
 
39.8% 
34.4% 
25.8% 
       
 Edu 
 high-sch. 
 some col. 
 college 
 
21.5% 
23.7% 
54.8% 
.15† .06 .09 .10 .15† -.11 .14† 
 Occupat. 56.43 (12.76) .10 .03 .14† .28*** .09 -.06 .18* 
 Speed .12 (.89) .18
*
 -.02 .20
*
 .12 .08 -.05 .16
*
 
 Digitspan 18.72 (5.50) .19
*
 .00 .14† .01 .03 -.02 .11 
 C.IQ  .12 .04 .11 .13
†
 .09 .03 .16
*
 
U.S. Gender 51.6 %♀ -.04 -.07 -.06 .03 -.04 -.01 -.06 
n=225 Age 47.34 (14.70) .35
***
 .33
***
 .30
***
 .38
***
 .22
**
 .08 .48
***
 
 Age group 
 25-40 
 41-59 
 60-79 
 
40% 
32% 
28% 
       
 Edu 
 high-sch. 
 some col. 
 college 
 
11.1% 
30.4% 
58.6% 
.04 .07 .18
*
 .09 .05 .12
†
 .17
*
 
 Occupat. 58.08 (16.34) .11 .14† .10 .07 .13† .07 .18* 
 Speed -.10 (1.08) -.11 -.18
*
 -.07 -.08 .03 .04 -.10 
 Digitspan 17.97 (4.15) -.09 -.03 .13
†
 -.10 .07 .21
**
 .07 
 C.IQ  .11 .14† .26*** .00 .20** .20** .28*** 
Culture X Age  
β (SE) 
 -.28
*** 
(.05) 
-.12
*
 
(.05) 
-.23
***
 
(.06) 
-.16
***
 
(.04) 
-.11
*
 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.06) 
-.16
***
 
(.03) 
 Note: ♀=-1; ♂=1; C.IQ = Crystallized IQ (country-wise zs); Speed = Speed of Processing (full sample zs 
of the two standardized tasks); COM = Compromise; UN = Limits of Knowledge; FLEX = Flexibility; CH 
= Change; RES = Conflict Resolution; WIS = Composite Score. ***p ≤ .001. **p ≤ .01. *p ≤ .05. †p ≤ .1. 
 
Discussion 
 Using diverse samples of Americans and Japanese, the present study tested aging 
and cultural influences on reasoning schemas that are commonly associated with wisdom. 
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As predicted, Japanese, whose culture encourages interpersonal harmony, gain wisdom 
about social conflict and its avoidance earlier than Americans. The present findings fit 
well with the observation that Americans experience more conflicts than Japanese 
(Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994). It is possible that Americans gain wisdom in older age, 
because they learn about conflict resolution over the life span. Future research may test 
these patterns longitudinally, and explore whether they generalize to socio-emotional 
aspects of wisdom.  
 So far, this dissertation focused on individual and cultural differences in wisdom 
and consequences of wisdom. An important question concerns the malleability of this 
construct. Can wisdom be facilitated? Work in cultural psychology and social cognition 
suggests that one such mechanism is the tendency to distance oneself from one’s 
immediate experience and to take a third-person or self-distant perspective when thinking 
about interpersonal experiences. Indeed, East Asians use self-distanced perspective more 
often than Americans, who have a tendency to self-immerse, or to adopt an “inside-out” 
perspective (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007; Wu & Keysar, 2008). Theoretically, East Asians 
(e.g. Japanese) have a higher propensity to adopt a self-distanced perspective because it 
enhances their sensitivity to contextual information, helping them fulfill their 
superordinate goal of maintaining interpersonal harmony. Americans are more likely to 
adopt a self-immersed perspective because it fosters personal agency, which is more 
important in their culture (Cohen et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that self-distancing 
may be the underlying mechanism explaining cultural differences in wisdom observed in 
Study 5. Chapter V will discuss two studies that directly test whether self-distance is 
indeed the mechanism facilitating wise reasoning and behavior. 
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CHAPTER V 
Studies 6-7 – Boosting Wisdom through Distance from the Self  
Although humans strive to be wise, they often fail to do so when reasoning over 
issues that have profound personal implications. Consider, for example, the unemployed 
worker who stops searching for employment during tough times under the assumption 
that the job market will never improve or the party loyalist who predicts doomsday if the 
candidate they support loses the election. In the last part of my dissertation I examine 
how wisdom can be enhanced when people reason about such profoundly meaningful 
personal issues – by adopting a self-distanced perspective on these issues.  
The psychological model of wisdom I propose is that wisdom involves certain 
forms of pragmatic reasoning and behavior that help people navigate important life 
challenges (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Basseches, 1980; Craft, Gardner, & Claxton, 2008; 
Kramer, 2000). A variety of factors give rise to this quality. In my dissertation work I 
identified several common aspects of wise reasoning about social conflicts. Some of 
these strategies are: recognizing that the world is in flux and the future is likely to change; 
recognizing that there are limits associated with one’s own knowledge; and possessing a 
prosocial orientation that promotes the “common good.” These strategies are also 
applicable to issues that do not involve a group conflict.  
A common feature of these different dimensions of wisdom is that they require 
people to transcend their egocentric viewpoints to take the “big picture” into account and 
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reason holistically (Cohen, et al., 2007; Craft, et al., 2008; Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001; 
Staudinger & Glück, 2011). Findings from multiple areas of research indicate that people 
from Western cultures experience difficulty engaging in this process when they reason 
about personally meaningful issues (Epley & Caruso, 2009). Under such circumstances, 
people tend to reflexively focus on the concrete details of their experiences (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2010; Grossmann & Kross, 2010). This suggests that to enhance wise reasoning a 
mechanism is needed to allow people to transcend their egocentric point of view as they 
reason about self-relevant issues. 
I hypothesize that one way of facilitating this shift in the way people reason about 
personally meaningful issues is to enhance psychological distance. Preliminary evidence 
supporting this view comes from experiments indicating that cueing people to reflect over 
negative past experiences from a self-distanced or “fly on the wall” perspective leads 
them to reason more abstractly (c.f., Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Trope & Liberman, 2010) 
and research indicating that psychological distance enhances global processing (Förster, 
Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008). However, no research has examined whether the particular 
type of thinking style that distancing promotes translates into wise reasoning.  
I addressed this issue by cueing participants in two experiments to reason about 
how a personally meaningful issue would develop from either a distanced or immersed 
perspective. I examined the implications of these manipulations for two common types of 
wise reasoning – dialecticism (i.e., recognizing that the world is in flux and future is 
likely to change; Basseches, 1984; Kramer & Woodruff, 1986), and intellectual humility 
(i.e., recognizing the limits of one’s own knowledge; Baltes & Smith, 2008; Ryan, 2008). 
Because prosocial orientation is often conceptualized as an important consequence of 
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wise reasoning (Sternberg, 1998), Study 7 also examined the effect of distancing on two 
prosocial tendencies. 
Study 6 – Wisdom in the Time of Economic Recession 
College seniors and recent college graduates who were unsuccessful at securing a 
job after graduation were asked to reason about how the economic recession 
characterizing the United States economy at the time of the study would influence their 
career prospects. I focused on this issue to examine how distancing would influence wise 
reasoning over an issue that was both ecologically valid and meaningful to the present 
sample. Participants were randomly assigned to reason about this issue from a distanced 
or immersed perspective. I predicted that distancing would enhance wise reasoning.  
Method 
Sample 
A random sample of 57 University of Michigan college seniors and recent 
graduates who were unsuccessful at securing a job after graduation at the time of data 
collection (35 females; Mage = 21.57, SDage = 2.22) participated in a study on human 
reasoning in exchange for $12.  
Procedure 
A hypothesis-blind experimenter informed participants that the study explored 
“the ways people talk and reason about different future events.” Participants were asked 
to select a card from a deck to choose a topic to discuss. Each card described the current 
recession in the U.S. and rising unemployment rates. Participants were first instructed to 
“take a few minutes to think about how the current economic climate will impact you 
personally.” They were then randomly assigned to reason aloud to an interviewer about 
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how the recession would impact their career prospects from either an immersed 
perspective (i.e., “imagine the events unfolding before your own eyes as if you were right 
there”; n = 27) or a distanced perspective (i.e., “imagine the events unfolding as if you 
were a distant observer”; n = 30) using a modified version of established procedures 
(Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). Interviewers followed a standardized script to deliver 
all instructions.  
Affect  
Participants rated their current mood on a 1 (very unhappy) to 9 (very happy) 
scale at baseline (M = 6.57, SD = 1.28) and immediately after reasoning about their 
future (M = 6.00, SD = 1.21).   
Wise reasoning 
Participants’ responses were recorded, transcribed and content analyzed for 
dialectical thinking and intellectual humility following similar procedures to those in 
Studies 1-5. Two hypothesis and condition-blind raters coded participants’ responses on 
these dimensions using a 1 (not at all) to 3 (a lot) scale (inter-rater rs > .9).  
Results  
Response omissions and an equipment malfunction resulted in missing values for 
post manipulation affect (n = 3), and wise reasoning (n = 4). I used a multiple imputation 
approach to replace missing values (Rubin, 1996), which produces parameter estimates 
that are less biased than listwise deletion and mean substitution procedures (Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). Missing values were not related to condition [χ²(1, N = 57) = .86, ns.]; 
the results of all analyses remained substantively the same when analyses were performed 
without missing values imputed.  
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All participants reported feeling less happy after reasoning about their future 
compared to baseline [F(1,56) = 24.41, p < .001, η2p = .30]. This effect was not 
moderated by condition [F(1,55) < 1, ns. ].  
The main predictions concerned the effect of distancing on wise reasoning. As 
predicted, participants in the distanced group were significantly more likely to recognize 
the limits of their knowledge [F(1,55) = 7.00 p = .01, η2p = .11] and recognize that the 
future was likely to change [F(1,55) = 7.14, p = .01, η2p = .12; see Table V.1 and Figure 
V.1, Panel A ]. Controlling for gender, baseline affect and pre- vs. post-manipulation 
change in affect did not alter these results.  
Table V.1 – Examples of Wise Responses from Study 6  
Note: Italics added for emphasis. 
 
  
Wisdom Dimension 
 
Examples 
Recognition of limits of 
knowledge/ humility 
This is a challenge. In the immediate future I see myself enrolled in a vet 
school at Michigan State, and being a lab technician. And then this would 
roll out either to vet school after the lab technician or working somewhere 
whether it be as a doctor in a clinic setting or in a lab. Maybe I see myself 
in Michigan, in the close proximity and then maybe in a different state 
wherever any of these paths take me, possibly abroad in Latin America. 
[…] But I can’t really understand what the future of the economy is going 
to be like. In part, this is because I don’t really understand the economic 
situation well enough.  
Recognition of the  
likelihood  of change 
It’s going to be hard in the first couple of years to find a job, because the 
whole economy has just gone downhill. But once I do get a job, it’s going 
to be a good job. It’ll be good pay and then I’ll be able to afford for 
myself and then eventually my family, so I think it’ll be hard for the first 
couple of years and after that, it should look better. […] The economy 
right now is just bad, but it’s coming back up. I think the current economy 
will be an obstacle that will actually help me become a better and more 
motivated worker.  
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Figure V.1 –The Effect of Self-Distancing on Wise Reasoning in Study 6 
 
Note: Error bars represent 1 standard error above/below the mean value for each condition. 
 
 
Study 7 – Wisdom and Political Downfall 
The Study 6 findings provide preliminary evidence indicating that distancing 
enhances wise reasoning. Study 7 aimed to extend these findings in four ways.  
The first goal of Study 7 was to conceptually replicate the Study 6 results by 
having participants’ reason about a different personally meaningful issue. Specifically, 
during the 3 weeks preceding the 2008 U.S. presidential election I asked strongly liberal 
and conservative participants to think about how various foreign and domestic issues 
would play out over the next four years if the candidate that they did not endorse were to 
win the election from a distanced or immersed perspective. 
Second, prior research indicates that different types of distancing manipulations 
similarly influence the way people construe information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
60 
 
Therefore, to further establish the relationship between distance and wisdom I used a 
different type of manipulation. 
Third, I examined the effect of distancing on two prosocial tendencies, dealing 
with participants’ political beliefs and willingness to discuss heated political issues with 
the members of the other party. I expected participants in the distancing group to become 
less extreme and thus endorse their liberal or conservative views less strongly after the 
experiment. In addition, I measured openness to diverse viewpoints behaviorally by 
asking participants if they would like to join a bipartisan group devoted to discussing 
political issues in an informal setting at the end of the study. I predicted that participants 
who distanced would be more likely to join this group. 
Finally, I explored the relationship between distance, wise reasoning, and 
prosocial tendencies. If distancing influences prosocial tendencies, I predicted that it 
would do so via wise reasoning.  
Method 
Sample 
Three weeks before the 2008 U.S. presidential election 54 strongly liberal or 
conservative participants (27 females; Mage = 18.5 years, SDage = .81) were recruited for a 
study on human reasoning in exchange for course credit. All participants were U.S. 
citizens. Participants were enrolled if they scored in the “very liberal” (≤ 3; n = 47) or 
“very conservative“ (≥ 7; n = 7) range on a 10-point political ideology question (Inglehart 
& Baker, 2000) administered during university subject pool prescreening. 
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Procedure  
Participants first read summaries of the Democrat and Republican parties’ 
position on a variety of issues that were taken from each party’s website. They were then 
asked to focus on two issues they felt strongly about. Next, they were randomly assigned 
to reason aloud to an interviewer about how each issue would develop over the next four 
years if the candidate that they did not endorse wins the election from an immersed (n = 
29) or distanced (n = 25) perspective.  
I used a spatial distance paradigm to manipulate distance (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2006). Specifically, participants in the immersed group reasoned 
about each issue from the perspective of a U.S. citizen living in the U.S. for the next four 
years; distanced participants reasoned about each issue from the perspective of a citizen 
of Iceland living in Iceland for the next four years.  
Affect  
The same measure was used to measure baseline (M = 6.58, SD = 1.09) and post-
manipulation affect (M = 6.02, SD = 1.18) as in Study 6. 
Wise reasoning  
Participants’ predictions about the future were content analyzed for dialectical 
thinking and intellectual humility following the Study 6 procedures (inter-rater rs > .9).  
Attitude assimilation  
Participants’ rated their level of political ideology after the interview using the 
same question administered before the experiment. Political ideology adjustment scores 
were computed by first reverse coding scores for liberal participants and then subtracting 
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post-manipulation scores from pre-manipulation scores for all participants such that 
lower scores reflected less extreme views (M = -.19, SD = 1.73).  
Openness to diverse viewpoints 
At the end of the study participants were asked if they were interested in joining a 
bipartisan group devoted to discussing political issues in an informal setting. They were 
told to leave their email address if they wanted to join the group. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
Response omissions and a procedural error resulted in missing values for post 
manipulation affect (n = 2), wise reasoning (n = 8) and attitude assimilation (n = 7). I 
again used a multiple imputation approach to replace missing values, which were 
unrelated to condition [χ²(1, N = 54) = .52, ns. ]. The magnitude of our observed effects 
remained substantively the same when analyses were performed without missing values 
imputed. Neither gender, nor political ideology, nor the type of political issue that 
participants discussed moderated the results.  
Affect and wise reasoning 
Participants reported feeling more distressed after the experiment compared to 
baseline [F(1, 52) = 22.49, p < .001, η2p = .29 ]. This effect was not moderated by 
condition (F < 1).  
As in Study 6, distanced participants were more likely to predict that the future 
was likely to change [F(1, 52) = 11.14, p = .002, η 2p = .18] and acknowledge the limits of 
their knowledge [F(1, 52) = 11.80, p = .001, η2p = .19; see Figure V.2].   
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Figure V.2 – The Effect of Self-Distancing on Wise Reasoning in Study 7 
 
Figure V.3 – Change in Political Ideology as Effect of Self-distancing 
 
Note: Post manipulation scores minus pre manipulation scores. Negative values mean that participants’ 
endorsed their political ideological believes less strongly after the experiment; positive values mean that 
participants endorsed their political ideological beliefs more strongly after the experiment. Error bars 
represent 1 standard error above/below the mean value for each condition. 
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Prosocial tendencies: Attitude assimilation and openness to alternative viewpoints 
 Participants in the distancing group endorsed their political views less strongly 
after the experiment compared to baseline (F(1,52) = 4.84, p = .03, η2p = .09; see Figure 
V.3) and signed up to join a bipartisan political issue discussion group at the end of the 
study at a higher rate (8/25) than immersed participants (3/29; B = -1.41, SE = .75,  
Wald = 3.56, p = .059).  
Mediation analyses 
I performed a path analysis to examine whether the effect of condition on 
prosocial tendencies was mediated by wise reasoning, which I operationalized as the 
average of participants dialectical reasoning and intellectual humility scores (r = .49, p 
< .001). Wise reasoning was correlated with openness to diverse viewpoints (Spearman’s 
ρ = .57, p < .001) but not attitude assimilation scores (r = -.09). Thus, I focused on the 
former measure. 
Because the pathway I examined included both a continuous variable (wise 
reasoning) and a categorical variable (openness to diverse viewpoints), I ran a series of 
linear and logistic regressions to test for mediation following established procedures 
(Mackinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). These analyses provided evidence for mediation 
(see Figure V.4 for statistics). Specifically, self-distancing predicted wise reasoning and 
openness to diverse viewpoints, and the effect of wise reasoning on openness to diverse 
viewpoints was significant when controlling for self-distancing. Finally, a bootstrap test 
indicated a significant indirect effect of condition on openness to diverse viewpoints via 
wise reasoning. 
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Figure V.4 – Wise Reasoning Mediates the Effect of Self-distancing on Openness to 
Diverse Viewpoints 
 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (betas) are shown. The value in parentheses reveals the relationship 
between condition and openness to diverse viewpoints after controlling for wise reasoning. Statistical 
significance is indicated by superscripts (
†
p = .06, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .005). The values in the 
square brackets correspond to the 95% confidence interval from a bootstrap test performed to assess the 
significance of the indirect effect. The mediation is significant if the confidence interval does not include 
zero. 
Discussion 
 These findings illustrate one way of cultivating wisdom when people reason about 
personally meaningful issues. They furthermore suggest that people need not go to great 
lengths to reason wisely – distancing was manipulated in both studies with minimal 
intervention. Future research is needed to examine the mechanisms underlying the 
aforementioned effects, and whether people can be trained to distance in daily life. 
Two caveats are in order before concluding. First, distancing did not influence 
self-reported mood in either study. This suggests that mood did not mediate the effects of 
distancing on wise reasoning. On the other hand, this finding was unexpected given prior 
research indicating that distancing dampens emotional reactions (e.g., Kross, et al., 2005). 
One explanation for this asymmetry concerns methodological differences across these 
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studies. In the present studies 6-7 participants’ reasoned about what would happen in 
their future, whereas studies linking distancing with less emotionality have cued 
participants to focus on why they felt the way they did in their past. This explanation 
notwithstanding, future research is needed to examine the relationship between distance, 
emotion, and wisdom. 
Further, attitude assimilation was not significantly correlated with the other 
wisdom measures in Study 7. However, failure to observe a significant relationship 
between conceptually related outcomes measured across levels of analysis is not 
uncommon. For example, established measures of cognitive style (Na et al., 2010), 
attitudes (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), and emotion (Ayduk, Mischel, & Downey, 
2002) often correlate weakly or non-significantly. It is also possible that another aspect of 
wise reasoning that I did not assess influenced attitude assimilation.  
 
  
67 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary 
 Only recently have researchers started to investigate psychological processes 
related to wisdom (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Jeste et al., 2010; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). 
Little is understood about the macro-and micro-level mechanisms influencing wisdom, or 
the consequences of wise reasoning. The studies presented in this dissertation take a step 
toward filling this gap. I started by reviewing previous theoretical and behavioral 
research. A psychological model was proposed that characterizes wisdom through the use 
of pragmatic reasoning strategies. Focusing on these strategies, Chapter II addressed the 
question of age-related gains in wisdom, specifically in the domain of social conflicts. 
Results from two studies indicated that older people, relative to young and middle-aged 
people, display greater wisdom when analyzing social conflicts. These results were 
robust when controlling for various cognitive and socio-economic factors (e.g. cognitive 
abilities, social class, or education). Furthermore, an extensive group of professional 
counselors and wisdom researchers validated the coding scheme used to measure wise 
reasoning. Building on this work, Chapter III assessed the consequences of wise 
reasoning. Specifically, Study 4 tested whether wisdom is positively related to well-being. 
Results showed that people who made more use of wise reasoning schemas reported 
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greater well-being on the majority of indicators. Moreover, wise reasoning partially 
mediated the positive relationship between aging and well-being. Next, Chapter IV 
situated the findings about the adult development of wisdom in a larger cultural context. 
To this end, Study 5 used procedures similar to those implemented in Studies 1-2 in 
Japan. The results indicated that younger and middle-aged Japanese were wiser in 
analysis of social conflicts than Americans, yet unlike Americans did not show aging 
differences in wisdom across the life span. Finally, Chapter V reported two studies 
testing the malleability of wise reasoning and behavior. In Study 6, unemployed college 
graduates who were reminded of the current economic recession showed greater wisdom 
when predicting the events from a detached, third-person perspective vs. an immersed 
first-person perspective. In Study 7, two weeks before the U.S. presidential election 
college students were asked to imagine their favorite candidate losing the election. Those 
students instructed to take a perspective of a distant observer living outside the United 
States (vs. an immersed perspective of a U.S. citizen) showed greater wisdom when 
predicting anticipated societal changes. Moreover, wise reasoning mediated the effects of 
distance from the self on cooperative behavior. 
Implications and future directions 
 I posed the following four questions in the introduction: i) Does wisdom come 
with age? ii) What are the consequences of wise reasoning? iii) What role does culture 
play in wisdom-related processes? iv) Can we facilitate wisdom and if so what are the 
underlying psychological mechanisms?  
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Aging and well-being  
 One of the central findings is that older Americans are wiser than younger 
Americans. This finding stimulates several questions dealing with potential underlying 
processes. First, at this point it is not clear whether wisdom-related processes are general 
or rather domain/situation specific. The present research focused on personal problems 
and social conflicts – which are all important domains of life in where wisdom or the lack 
of it can be demonstrated. Yet, there are other domains of equal importance, such as 
ethical dilemmas. One endeavor for future research concerns examining whether 
strategies associated with wisdom can be found in legal reports dealing with ethical and 
non-ethical dilemmas, thus testing the association between ethics, legal decision making, 
and wise reasoning. Moreover, it would be worthwhile exploring theoretical links 
between wisdom and morality. Though originating in developmental research, a concern 
with morality is nowadays strongly embedded in social psychology (for review, see Haidt 
& Kesebir, 2010).  Research on morality has gone through a historical transition: from 
the virtue-based conception of a good person to the development of moral reasoning to 
more recent work on underlying mechanisms. In some ways this transition is comparable 
to the change in focus advocated for future wisdom research (Staudinger & Glück, 2011), 
and implemented in Studies 5-7 of the present dissertation. In addition, social 
psychological work on morality has shown that emotions and intuitions often guide our 
moral reasoning (e.g. Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). 
In a similar way, one important future direction in research on wisdom involves 
establishing links between the present research and wisdom for emotionally-charged 
events. Are the old still wise when a social dilemma requires a great amount of emotional 
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involvement? It is possible that self-immersion in the problem and the associated 
emotional involvement impairs the judgment of older people more than that of younger 
people, because older adults are generally less able to inhibit such information when its 
distracting than younger adults (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). On the other hand, the findings 
from Studies 6-7 suggest that older adults may chronically self-distance from the social 
conflict more than their younger counterparts and be less emotionally affected when 
reasoning about social life dilemmas. These boundary conditions should be examined in 
further detail in future work. 
In addition to its relevance for the wisdom construct in general, the question of 
specificity vs. generality of wisdom has direct implications for understanding how it is 
acquired and maintained. If wise reasoning is solely context-specific, generational 
changes in knowledge may prevent successful maintenance and transmission of wisdom 
from one generation to the next (Birren & Svensson, 2005). Thus, rapid generational 
changes – as found in many modern societies these days – may put older adults at a 
disadvantage. In line with this hypothesis, Staudinger and Baltes showed that the context 
of the scenario – dealing with an issue that is typical for an older vs. for a younger person 
– facilitates the wisdom-related reasoning performance (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). 
Research in the social psychological tradition would be of great value here, because it 
could help to identify social contexts under which older adults perform at their best.  
  Studies 1-4 highlight the positive side of growing older, even in light of general 
cognitive decline. These findings are consistent with several theoretical models of human 
development. Paul and Margret Baltes (Baltes & Baltes, 1990) suggested in their 
Selective Optimization with Compensation Model that successful development 
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encompasses the selection of functional domains on which to focus one’s resources, 
optimization of developmental potential (i.e. maximization of gains) and compensation 
for losses, thereby ensuring the maintenance of functioning (i.e. minimization of losses). 
It is plausible that older adults concentrate their resources more in the interpersonal 
domain than younger adults and gain greater experience to deal with losses in this domain. 
Consistent with this assumption, research indicates that older (vs. younger) Americans 
are more motivated to invest in harmonious interpersonal relationships (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Another model that is consistent with the present finding 
has been put forward by Lynn Hasher and colleagues (Healey & Hasher, 2009; Zimerman, 
Hasher, & Goldstein, 2011). Specifically, Hasher pointed out that under some 
circumstances age-related declines in basic cognitive functions (e.g. working memory) 
may incidentally result in more optimal decision-making. For instance, when deciding 
between multiple options older adults reduce the number of choices to a manageable 
number or rely on efficient decision search strategies (Yoon, Cole, & Lee, 2009). The 
present research suggests that this mechanism of compensation may also extend to 
higher-order reasoning. However, the exact nature of such compensation models (e.g. 
explicit vs. implicit) is not yet fully understood. 
Study 4 also sheds light on the relationship between reasoning abilities and well-
being. This research indicates that pragmatic reasoning strategies, which are influenced 
by life experiences and situated in a social context, are relevant for subjective well-being, 
whereas cognitive abilities (as measured by intelligence tests) are not. Beyond its direct 
contribution to well-being research, this finding has implications for the body of work on 
aging and well-being. Past research reliably demonstrated that aging in Western cultures 
72 
 
is associated with changes in cognitive and socio-emotional processing. Whereas fluid 
cognitive abilities such as working memory or executive functioning decline over 
adulthood (e.g. D. C. Park, et al., 2002), on measures related to emotion and emotion 
regulation, a positivity effect is quite common when people get older: both cross-
sectional and longitudinal studies find older adults to report more positive well-being 
than their younger counterparts (e.g. Carstensen, et al., 2000; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). 
Though such findings of well-being differences between younger and older adults are 
abundant (e.g. Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & Deaton, 2010), limited empirical work has 
addressed the questions of its origin. Some theorists suggest that this positivity effect in 
well-being may reflect optimization of affect and cognition (e.g. Labouvie-Vief & 
Blanchard-Fields, 1982). Indeed, research by Blanchard-Fields and colleagues indicates 
that older adults solve emotionally salient and interpersonal problems in more effective 
ways than young adults do (for review, see Blanchard-Fields, 2007). The present 
dissertation extends these findings, proposing that wise reasoning may be one of the 
mechanisms leading to greater well-being in older age. Indeed, Study 4 shows that wise 
reasoning statistically mediates the positive relationship between aging and various 
components of middle-aged and older adults’ well-being: aging leads to greater well-
being in part because aging facilitates greater use of wise reasoning strategies.   
 Social identity perspective may provide further insights about the mechanisms of 
wisdom development. One plausible hypothesis is that wisdom-related expertise in 
resolving social dilemmas in advanced adulthood is in part due to the continuous 
expectations from the elderly to give “wise” advice on matters of social life to the 
younger generations. Frequently assuming the role of advice-givers, older adults may 
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gain greater experience in dealing with social dilemmas over time. Such advice-giving 
may promote wise reasoning. Consistent with this idea, research shows that giving advice 
to someone else (vs. deciding for oneself) can promote a more balanced decision (Kray & 
Gonzalez, 1999), including a more holistic search of information when making as a 
decision (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005). Following this logic, it is possible that 
aging gains in wisdom observed among Americans in Studies 1-2 were in part due to 
older people being interviewed by younger people
4
.  Future research may address this 
question by systematically testing wise reasoning and behavior when the participant is 
giving advice to a more mature/more-experienced vs. younger/less-experienced 
communication partner, as well as consequences of such role expectations on wisdom 
development over time. 
Finally, there is a concern about the causality of the aging-wisdom and aging-
wisdom-wellbeing links. One alternative hypothesis to the one put forward in this 
dissertation is that the current Generation Me of Americans is more self-absorbed than 
previous generations, including the older Americans in our study, and thus less wise 
when thinking about social issues. Indeed, some researchers suggests that the current 
generation of young Americans has a more inflated sense of the self (e.g. Twenge & 
Campbell, 2001) and they are less empathetic than earlier generations (Konrath, O'Brien, 
& Hsing, 2011). However, others found little if any generational change in egotism, self-
enhancement, or individualism (Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010). Further, this research 
is based on self-reported level of individualism or empathy, thus measuring belief about 
one’s dispositions rather than actual performance. As indicated in the introduction, 
                                                          
4
 Note, this explanation does not account for the difference between middle-aged and older Americans. 
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inferences from such measures may be problematic for wisdom research, because it is not 
clear what greater scores on such measures (e.g. a belief that one is very empathetic) 
mean. Finally, Studies 1-2 indicate significant effects between middle-aged and older 
adults, which cannot be accounted for by this hypothesis. With regard to the question of 
directionality of the relationship between aging, wisdom, and well-being, positive affect 
was not related to well-being, thus it seems unlikely that wisdom is the product of chronic 
positive emotional experiences (Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, 1993). On these grounds I 
suspect that wise reasoning leads to greater well-being, rather than vice-versa. However, 
additional longitudinal research is desirable before strong claims regarding causality may 
be made.  
Distance from the Self 
Ancient and modern scholars on wisdom, as well as lay beliefs about this concept 
suggest that wisdom is not innate and that it can be gained through experience (Jeste, et 
al., 2010). Yet little attention has been devoted to identifying psychological mechanisms 
explaining how these gains can be achieved. I hypothesized that one path to greater 
wisdom may have to do with the capacity for individuals to “distance” themselves from 
their immediate experience, as suggested by both Eastern and Western philosophies (e.g. 
James, 1890; Lopez, 2007). Indeed, a growing body of empirical work suggests that 
people are capable of taking such a distanced perspective and to detach themselves from 
their egocentric viewpoint of “here and now” (Trope & Liberman, 2010). This research 
shows that a detached viewpoint can lead to greater sensitivity to moral issues (Eyal, 
Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), greater self-control (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999), better emotion-regulation (Kross & Ayduk, 2011), and greater likelihood 
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of reaching an agreement in negotiations (Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006). The 
present Studies 6-7 add to this research by showing that a distanced perspective on the 
self further promotes wise reasoning about personally relevant concerns.  
What are the processes underlying the effects of distancing from the self on wise 
reasoning? One possibility is that the act of self-distancing influences the experience of 
the immediate situation at hand, which may in turn result in wiser reasoning and behavior. 
According to the feelings-as-information hypothesis, our immediate experiences and 
feelings are often used as a source of information in their own right (Schwarz & Clore, 
1996). One such experience deals with fluency of the experience, that is the subjective 
experience of ease or difficulty associated with completing a mental task. It is plausible 
that asking people to adopt a self-distanced vs. the habitual egocentric perspective (Epley 
& Caruso, 2009) when thinking about difficult personal issues results in a meta-cognitive 
experience of less fluency. This lack of fluency may lead to a more deliberate processing 
and higher-order reasoning (Oppenheimer, 2008).  
Current theories about  psychological distance also suggest that its effects are 
induced by a higher-level construal, which is a relatively abstract, coherent, and 
superordinate mental representation of the issue at hand (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
Higher level (i.e. abstract) construal may result in a schematic representation of an 
experience. However, higher-level construal may also underweight potentially important 
contextual information (e.g. Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Several empirical demonstrations 
illuminate some conditions under which such abstraction may in fact be detrimental. 
Inducing temporally or spatially distanced perspective results in more correspondence 
bias (i.e. underweighting situational constraints on observed behavior; Henderson, Fujita, 
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Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Study 2; S. Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003; Study 1), 
and more spontaneous trait-inferences from trait-implying behaviors (Rim, Uleman, & 
Trope, 2009). Further, inducing temporal distance leads to overconfident predictions of 
one’s future performance (S. Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2006), and greater 
expectation of cross-situational consistency of one’s own personality (Wakslak, 
Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008).  
An alternative to the dominant interpretation of these finding is that different 
forms of self-distance (e.g. temporal and visual) may also not be represented 
hierarchically. For instance, it is plausible that one can maintain a visually distant 
perspective on an issue without activating a temporally distant representation of oneself. 
Moreover, philosophical work on the phenomenology of mind suggests that self-distance 
is inherently social, i.e. it is functionally oriented towards improving one’s social 
experience (Cohen, et al., 2007; Ingerslev, 2011; Sartre, 1992), thus the cognitive 
abstraction hypothesis may not capture the full range of underlying processes. 
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that distancing may not always lead to wise reasoning 
and such boundary conditions need to be explored.  
Finally, distance from the self likely involves other processes than construal-level 
representations or fluency. One such process deals with the reduction of emotional 
arousal. Indeed, reduction in arousal is a desired outcome in many meditational practices 
that emphasize self-distance (Shapiro, 2008). Importantly, social dilemmas of high 
personal concern can elicit high arousal negative emotions, such as anger or fear 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Past research also indicates that these emotions can lower 
such wisdom-related behaviors as search for a compromise (e.g. Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, 
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& Raia, 1997) or perspective-taking (Denham, 1986). It is possible that distance from the 
self can either dampen
5
 the level of arousal, or possibly change the appraisals leading to 
the high arousal negative emotions. Future work may explore these possibilities by 
manipulating the levels of self-distancing and emotional arousal in the same research 
design.  
Culture  
 In the most recent review of empirical wisdom research, Staudinger and Glück 
(2011) reported a notable increase of psychological work on this topic. These authors 
concluded with the following recommendation: “It seems important that researchers in 
this area move beyond the investigation of cultural differences in subjective theories of 
wisdom and begin to study actual expressions of wisdom in different cultural contexts.” 
(p. 236).  
 This dissertation work addresses precisely this issue. It accomplishes this goal by 
building on a growing body of research suggesting that cultures differ in the ways they 
approach social conflicts. East Asians are more concerned with maintaining interpersonal 
harmony and avoiding conflicts than Westerners(e.g. Leung, 1987, 1988; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Morris, Leung, & Sethi, 1999; Triandis, 1989). The cultural hypothesis 
proposed in this dissertation is that such cultural differences have developmental 
consequences for reasoning about social conflict. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
younger and middle-aged Japanese showed greater use of wise reasoning strategies that 
emphasize the recognition of multiple perspectives, compromise, and the limits of 
knowledge than Americans. Yet, older Japanese were not wiser than older Americans. 
                                                          
5
 However, note that Studies 6-7 failed to observe an effect of self-distancing on mood.  
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These findings have several implications for cultural psychology. First, it adds to the 
growing body of research on cultural differences in social orientation (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) and holistic vs. analytic cognitive style (Cohen, et al., 
2007; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Varnum, et al., 2010)  by 
suggesting that differences in social orientation and cognitive style translate into 
differences in higher-order reasoning about social conflicts.  In addition, Studies 6-7 
suggest that distancing may be a mechanism that leads to cultural differences in wisdom 
observed in Study 5, as well as context-oriented reasoning in general (i.e., dialecticism; 
Nisbett, et al., 2001). This inference is consistent with research showing that cultures that 
endorse more context-oriented reasoning also tend to spontaneously distance more when 
reflecting over their experiences than cultures that are less contextual (Cohen, et al., 
2007; Grossmann & Kross, 2010). Moreover, the present findings raise the issue of the 
generalizability of aging and cultural effects observed on limited populations (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Most of the mainstream theories in adult development are 
based on Westerners (predominantly North Americans). Most of the theories in cultural 
psychology are based on college students. The current research demonstrates that it is 
important to examine both culture and adult development within the same research design. 
 It is important to point out that the operationalization of wisdom in the present 
research is based on some common characterizations found both in East Asian and 
Western philosophies, as well as previous behavioral studies. However, there are reasons 
to believe that cultures differ in their emphasis on some wisdom strategies over others. 
Takahashi and Bordia (2010) examined what adjectives people in different cultures 
associate with wisdom and found that Americans and Australians relate wisdom to being 
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“knowledgeable,” whereas Japanese and Indians relate it to being “discreet.”  Do these 
possible differences in lay theories about wisdom also translate into differences in wise 
reasoning? One finding from Study 5 suggests that this may be the case: young and 
middle-aged Japanese scored higher than Americans on all dimensions of wise reasoning 
except conflict resolution. In fact, Americans mentioned more conflict resolution 
statements than Japanese. This raises the question whether conflict resolution as 
measured in the present dissertation is in fact a universally endorsed, or rather a culture-
specific characteristic of wisdom. A task for future research would be to explore culture-
specific characterizations of wisdom and associated psychological processes.   
 Finally, one important future direction concerns the role of practices (Morling & 
Lamoreaux, 2008) in cultural transmission of wisdom-related strategies.  Indeed, some 
research in the domain of education suggests that differences in practices influencing 
cultural transmission may start as early as elementary school. Researchers found that East 
Asian (e.g. Japanese, Taiwanese) textbooks emphasize wisdom-related themes such as 
interpersonal harmony and compromise, and taking a self-distanced perspective more 
than American textbooks (Imada, 2010; Lanham, 1979; Wang, 1993; Zimet, 1972). 
Future research may extend this work to other domains (e.g. newspapers, advertising) to 
explore how wisdom-related practices are culturally transmitted and maintained.   
Practical implications 
 The results of this dissertation also have a number of practical implications. The 
finding that older Americans are wiser in analysis of social conflicts than young and 
middle-aged adults (Studies 1-2) suggests that it may be advisable to consider older 
Americans for key social roles involving counseling, teaching, legal decisions, and 
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intergroup conflict negotiations. Given the abundance of research on cognitive decline in 
late adulthood, this research may provide an impetus to clinicians to emphasize the 
inherent strengths of the elderly. The finding that wise reasoning is associated with 
individual well-being and longevity (Study 4) also suggests that boosting wisdom may be 
a strategy to increase individual well-being. Indeed, the results from a set of experiments 
in Chapter V demonstrate that wise reasoning and behavior can be boosted via minimal 
interventions. It is noteworthy that the shifts in wise reasoning and behavior were due to 
relatively simple manipulations. This suggests that wisdom may be highly malleable. The 
present work can lay a foundation for developing interventions to increase wise reasoning 
and behavior in daily life, responding to a recent call for greater role of wisdom in 
education (Ferrari & Potworowski, 2008; Sternberg, 2001), and social sciences 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001; Maxwell, 1984).  An important future task will be to identify strategies 
that can help to translate wise reasoning into wise action (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). 
Conclusion 
 The current dissertation provides a systematic investigation of the psychological 
construct of wise reasoning. It highlights individual and group-level factors such as age 
and culture, explores the association between wisdom and well-being, and examines how 
wisdom can be facilitated. A key challenge for future research is to develop an 
increasingly fine-grained understanding of how these processes promote wisdom. 
Addressing this issue, along with the other questions raised by these findings, promises to 
enhance knowledge concerning how wisdom operates and can be cultivated in daily life. 
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